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THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO PARDON:
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
WILLIAM F. DUKER*
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States specifically invests the
President with the power "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment."' This power is not among the most awesome powers of the
American Chief Executive; it is, at best, his most benevolent power.
This capacity for benevolence, however, has not inspired this study.
The Article was prompted, rather, by the complacent acceptance of
an apparently benign executive gift that cannot be checked by the
other branches of government. This lack of restriction on the exer-
cise of the power suggests that it is time to consider alteration of the
President's pardoning power.
This Article, primarily a constitutional and legal history, explores
one facet of the United States' Executive's power to pardon. The
political history surrounding the power is not discussed except inso-
far as it affected the form of the power and insofar as it aids in an
understanding of the prerogative. Section I commences with the
history of the development of the power in medieval England, then
examines the form of the power in the American colonies and em-
bryo states. In Section II the operation of the pardon clause will be
analyzed in a discussion of the progressive definition supplied by the
Supreme Court, the form in which the power "to grant reprieves and
pardons for offenses against the United States" may be exercised,
the effect of the presidential exercise on the other branches, the
exclusivity of the power, and the offenses that come within its scope.
In conclusion, the adoption of an amendment to rid the pardoning
power of its apprehensible novelty will be suggested.
* B.A., State University of New York at Albany; Ph.D. Candidate, Cambridge University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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I. THE POWER To PARDON: THE BRITISH HERITAGE
Early English Origins
Although one may encounter numerous references to the exercise
of the prerogative of mercy in Mosaic Law,2 Greek Law,3 and Roman
Law,' this study commences with the statutory history of the power
in early England. The pardoning power of England was applied in
the American colonies, and subsequently was incorporated into the
United States Constitution. The power of Article II, section 2, there-
fore, finds its root in early England.
The prerogative of mercy made its debut on the statutory rolls of
the Anglo-Saxon monarchs during the reign of King Ine of Wessex
(668-725 A.D.). Section 6 of the Laws provided: "If any one fight in
the king's house, let him be liable in all his property, and be it in
the king's doom whether he shall or shall not have life."' This
theme, which later was to appear in the laws of Alfred (871-901),,
Ethelred (978-1016),' and Cnut (1017-1035),' probably was fash-
ioned more to facilitate the king's safety than to spare him the sight
of insolent behavior. Alfred expanded the proscription to include the
drawing of a weapon; the subordinate rationale inspired the exten-
sion of the rule by Ethelred to include places of worship.' The laws
of Ine also placed the holding of a shire by any "ealdorman" who
"takes a thief, or to whom one taken is given, and [who] lets him
go, or conceals the theft" at the mercy of the sovereign. 0 Others who
engaged in the forbidden activity were merely to pay for the thief
according to his "wer," the value placed on his life. This principle
later appeared in section 4 of Ethelstan's Laws (924-940):
And he who oft before has been convicted openly of theft, and
shall go to the ordeal, and is there found guilty; that he be slain,
2. See, e.g., 2 Samuel 19:23; Luke 23:16-17.
3. See e.g., PLUTARCH, DEMOSTHENES 27 (M. Holden ed. 1893); PLUTARCH, LIVES OF SOLON
AND NICIAS ch. 19 (R. Patterson ed. 1930).
4. See, e.g., T. MOMMSEN, ABRISS DES ROMISCHEN STRAATSRECHTS 351 (1893); John 19:10.
5. 1 B. THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 107 (London 1840).
6. Id. at 67.
7. Id. at 331.
8. A. ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY 1205 (1925).
See also B. THORPE, supra note 5, at 409.
9. This proscription later was incorporated into the laws of King Cnut: "Then is it very
right, that God's church-'grith' within walls, and a Christian king's hand-'grith' stand equally
inviolate; and let him who infringes either forfeit land and life, unless the king will be merciful
to him." B. THORPE, supra note 5, at 359.
10. Id. at 125.
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unless the kindred or the lord be willing to release him by his 'wer'
and by the full 'ceap-gild,' and also have him in 'borh' that he
thenceforth desist from every kind of evil. If after that he again
steal, then let his kinsmen give him up to the reeve to whom it
may appertain, in such custody as they before took him out of
from the ordeal, and let him be slain in retribution of the theft.
But if any one defend him, and will take him, although he was
convicted at the ordeal, so that he might not be slain; then he
should be liable in his life, unless he should flee to the king, and
he should give him his life .... 1
Ethelstan's Laws also placed at the mercy of the king those who
avenged a thief, those who committed assaults, and those who at-
tacked travelers on the highway."
The power to pardon for other offenses later was recognized in the
laws of King Edmund (940-946) 3 and King Ethelred (978-1016)." 4
King Edgar's laws (959-975) placed notorious thieves and those
found plotting against the sovereign within the jurisdiction of his
prerogative of clemency. 5 King Cnut issued a proclamation guar-
anteeing that "as great mercy as possible shall be shown to him"
who "zealously desires to turn from lawlessness to observance of the
law."" Following the Norman conquest of England, the power to
pardon was incorporated into the Codes of William the Conqueror
(1066-1087).1 7 William's son Henry 1 (1100-1135) enlarged the scope
11. Id. at 229, 231 (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 231.
13. "Also we have ordained, respecting 'mund-brice' and 'ham-socns;' that he who shall
do it after this forfeit all that he owns, and be it in the king's doom whether he shall have
his life." Id. at 251.
14. "And the moneyers who work within a wood, or elsewhere; that they be liable in their
lives, unless the king will be merciful to them." Id. at 299.
15. Id. at 269. See also id. at 267.
16. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 207.
17. William, not known for his dedication to the novel, sought to confirm the traditional.
Section 63 of his Codes stated: "This we also command that all our Subjects have and enjoy
the Laws of King Edward in all Things; with the Addition of those which we have appointed
for the Benefit of the English." R. KELHAM, THE LAws OF WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR 86-88
(London 1799). One must assume that if the subjects were allowed the same rights and
privileges enjoyed previously, then the sovereign must have had benefit of the powers held
by former sovereigns. In addition, section 41 stated:
Let those, whose office it is to pronounce Judgment, take particular Care they
judge, in like Manner as they pray; when they say-"Forgive us our trespasses."
And we forbid any one to sell a Christian out of the Land, but more especially
into a Paganish Country; let us take care that the Soul which God redeemed
with His own Life, be not lost. Whosoever promotes Injustice, or pronounces
false Judgment, through Anger, Hatred, or Avarice, shall forfeit to the King 40
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of the king's pardon to facilitate the expeditious administration of
justice. Under the Leges Henrici Primi, pleas concerning serious
offenses that merited heavy punishment were assigned to the justice
and mercy of the sovereign alone "so that more abundant pardon
[could] be had for those seeking it and more abundant retribution
for those transgressing.' 5 The pardon was thus extended to
breach of his peace which he gives to anyone by his own hand;
contempt of his writs and anything which slanders injuriously his
own person or his command; causing the death of his servants in
a town or fortress or anywhere else; breach of fealty and treason;
contempt of him; construction of fortifications without permis-
sion; the incurring of outlawry (anyone who suffers this shall fall
into the king's hand, and if he has any bocland it shall pass to
the King's possession); manifest theft punishable by death."5
It is in the laws of Henry I that the first mention of compensation
in return for a pardon is discovered. 0
The annals of the royal prerogative of mercy are replete with
suggestions of the power's propensity for abuse. The benefits of the
power were rarely ever available to those condemned to death in
error. In other respects, however, it was disproportionately overem-
ployed.11 The power to pardon was especially useful in the early
periods when peace was never of long duration. Edward I was the
first English monarch to employ the pardon as an instrument of
conscription. L. 0. Pike has noted:
As soon as war was declared, it was the custom to issue a
proclamation, in which a general pardon of all homicides and
felonies was granted to everyone who would serve for a year at his
own cost. The terms were readily accepted, and the king in-
creased his force by a number of men who would perhaps be
inferior to none in courage, though they might not improve the
discipline of the army.22
s.; and if he cannot prove he did not know how to give a more right Judg-
ment, let him also lose his Franchise, unless he can redeem it at the King's good
Pleasure .... " Id. at 63, 65.
18. L. DOWNER, LEGES HENRcI PRIMI §§ 11, 16a, at 115 (1971).
19. Id. §§ 13, 1, at 117. Other offenses that presumably placed an individual at the king's
mercy are listed in sections 13, 2-13, 12, at 117-118, id.
20. Id. §§ 79, 2, at 247.
21. See N. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307 vii (1969):
"Criminals were pardoned before trial from motives which were unrelated to the circumstan-
ces of their crimes, with no suggestion of extenuation, and in complete disregard to maintain
the deterrent force of prospective punishment."
22. 1 L.O. PIKE, A HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 294 (1873). Other than pardons for
[Vol. 18:475
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Many of the defects in the practice of pardoning rested in the
criminal justice system of which it was a part. Prior to the sixteenth
century, the common law treated all homicides as felonies.23 In a
society with no other means of flexibility, the pardon served as the
sole instrument of justice for those who should not be punished. In
1249, for instance, four year old Katherine Passcavant was impris-
oned in the abbot of St. Alban's gaol because, in opening a door, she
accidentally pushed a younger child into a vessel of hot water, kill-
ing the child.2" Because of the inexorable system, subjects like Kath-
erine could not be acquitted by the courts; they required the king's
grace. Therefore subjects filed petitions of pardon immediately after
accidents or sudden death from natural causes. Of course, only
those who could pay for the pardon could secure one.2 This worked
harshly on those unable to afford a pardon. Although "innocent,"
they were forced to flee, and consequently were labeled outlaws. 2
The power of pardoning was employed on such various pretexts
that it was felt by members of Parliament to be a national reproach.
They responded to the excessive use of the power with a series of
petitions requesting the king to exercise his gift more prudently. The
first formal complaint against the pardoning power was registered
in 1309, during the reign of Edward II.
military purposes, pardons were granted for equally irrelevant reasons. See, e.g., 2 W.
HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448, 459, 476 (4th ed. 1936). In 1376, Edward I
granted a "general and special pardon for all crimes, treason itself not excepted, without any
fine, or paying fees for the seal; and set all debts to the crown, and prisoners for criminal
matters at liberty" to celebrate his fiftieth year of rule. 50 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1376). Of course, in
commemoration of special occasions, the monarch customarily proclaimed a general pardon
as a means of extending the regal occasion to the ranks of the lower classes.
23. 24 Henry 8, c. 5 (1532) settled the ambiguity of the need for a pardon for killing an
evildoer in self-defense. Not until the eighteenth century, however, did justices begin to allow
juries to return verdicts of "not-guilty" in cases in which technical guilt was established, yet
mitigating circumstances warranted a dismissal of guilt. In 1828 Parliament enacted a statute
providing that "no punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who shall kill
another by misfortune, or in his own defense, or in any other manner without felony." 3 J.
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 77 (1883) (construing 9 Geo. 4, c.. 31, § 10
(1828)).
24. See N. HURNARD, supra note 21, at viii.
25. See J. BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 191-
94 (1973).
26. N. HURNARD, supra note 21, at 41. Especially in the case of a fugitive from justice, the
king preferred payment in advance, though on occasion he accepted an offer of deferred
payment. For such transactions, terms and dates have been recorded carefully. See, e.g.,
CHRONICLES OF LONDON 28 (C. Kingsford ed. 1905); THE CHRONICLES OF NEWGATE CALENDOR
22 (C. Pelham ed. 1887). Pardons often were purchased for a price and later the king would
ask for additional payments beyond the negotiated price. CHRONICLES OF LONDON, supra at
28.
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Though graciously endowed with physical agility and strength,
Edward II lacked the mental coordination of his father2 7 He relied
heavily upon favorites, but unfortunately he was a poor judge of
character. The first of his favorites was Peter Gaveston, a foster
brother, banished during the reign of Edward I. The barons of the
kingdom perceived Gaveston as "a Gascon upstart who sharpened
his wit on their foibles and flaunted his power over the king."" Their
hatred for Gaveston, in conjunction with their distrust of Edward,
the proliferation of government, the problems of foreign affairs, and
the aftermath of the conflict during the reign of Edward I,2" caused
the barons to threaten to impede the coronation of Edward in 1308
unless he incorporated into the coronation oath a promise to "hold
and keep the laws . . . which the community of your realm shall
have chosen."'"
In 1309, Parliament made a grant to the king that was condi-
tioned upon his meeting eleven grievances embodied in the Stam-
ford Articles.32 One of the Articles complained of the use of petitions
and royal writs to interfere with criminal and civil proceedings.
3
1
27. T.F. TouT, THE PLACE OF THE REIGN OF EDWARD II IN ENGLISH HISTORY 9 (1914).
28. B. WILKINSON, THE LATTER MIDDLE AGES IN ENGLAND (1216-1485) 118 (1969).
29. See id. at 102-16.
30. B. WILKINSON, THE CORONATION IN HISTORY 13 (1953). The coronation oath was essen-
tially the only limitation on the early kings.
31. G.B. ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 198 (1921).
32. The Stamford Articles are significant because they represent the first "comprehensive
commons petition," a petition of several requests. See 1 Rotuli Parliamentorum 443-45. See
generally G.B. ADAMS, supra note 31.
33. Article 9 complained of liberal grants of charters of pardon for felonies:
Que par la ou larons sont enditez de larcines, roberies, homicides, et autres
felonies faites, trop legierement purchacent la Chartre le Roi de sa pees, par quoi
ceux qi les ont enditez ne osent demorer en lour pais pur doute ce ceux larons,
et plusurs se rentreent de enditementz fairel cele encheson: dont le poeple prie
remedie.
Le Roy voet, qe desoremes ne soit graunte pardoun de felonie, fors-q en cas
ou auncienement soliet estre grantez, c'est a saver, se horn tue autre par mesav-
enture, ou soy defendant, ou en deverie, et ce soit trove par Record de Justices.
([T]hat in cases where robbers are accused of robberies, larcenies, homicides,
and other crimes which have been committed, they too easily obtain the King's
Charter of reconciliation, with the result that those who accused them do not
dare remain in their country for fear of these robbers, and many refrain from
bringing accusations for this reason: wherefore the people petition for a remedy.
The King wills, that henceforth no pardon be granted for crimes, except in
cases where it formerly was accustomed to be granted, to wit, if one kills another
by accident, or in self-defense, or in a rage, and it be established by Judicial
Inquiry.)
(All translations are by Don A. Monson, Ph.D., University of Chicago. Assistant Professor of
Modern Languages, College of William and Mary.)
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Edward agreed to remedy the abuses; in 1310 the barons pressed
their advantage and compelled the king to appoint twenty-one of
their number as "Lord Ordinances" to supervise the implementa-
tion of the royal promises .3 Ordinances concerning the realm were
issued the following year. 5 The barons insisted upon the acceptance
of the Ordinances and warned that
unless the king conceded their demand, they would no longer
hold him as their king, nor keep the fealty they had sworn him,
especially since he himself would not keep the oath which he had
sworn at his coronation, for both law and natural reason warn
that faith will not be kept with him who does not himself keep
faith.36
The Ordinances dealt with such things as the exile of Gaveston, the
monarch's power to wage war, the appointment and dismissal of
counsellors, and the power to pardon:
Forasmuch as the People do feel themselves much aggrieved in
this, that Persons are emboldened to kill and rob others, because
that the King by evil advice giveth so lightly his Peace against
the form of Law; We do ordain, that no Felon or Fugitive be from
henceforth protected or defended from any manner of Felony, by
the King's Charter of his Peace granted to him, unless in a case
where the King can give grace according to his Oath, and that by
Process of Law and the Custom of the Realm, and if any Charter
be from henceforth granted and made in any other manner to any
one, it shall avail nothing, and be holden for none; And that no
open evil doer against the Crown and the Peace of the Land, be
by any one aided or maintained."7
34. The objective of the Ordinances and Ordainers has been somewhat in dispute. Appar-
ently, however, the Ordainers had no quarrel with the household system of administration.
Their grievance was that the system was not being operated effectively. Wilkinson, concurring
in the opinion of William Stubbs, maintains that the aims of the lords were merely to restrict
royal power by insisting on traditional counsel and consent in the appointment of officers of
the king and in other ways insisting on the subjugation of the king's government to the
dictates of custom and law. Although election privileges may have given the magnates influ-
ence in the selection of personnel for the important offices of government, it did not give them
control over the officer's daily activities, which depended ultimately on the commands of the
king or on authority delegated by the Crown. 2 B. WILKINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1216-1399 116 (1952). For a discussion of the issues in the debate see id.
at 112-21.
35. 1 RoTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 281 (Ordinances of 1311).
36. 2 CHRONICLES OF EDWARD I AND EDWARD II 163, reprinted in B. WILKINSON, supra note
34, at 122.
37. Ordinances of 1311, 5 Edw. 2, c. 28.
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Edward and Gaveston defied the Ordinances from the beginning.
Gaveston, who violated his mandated exile, was captured on May
19, 1312, and despite an agreement to the contrary, was executed
by the barons. This was the wedge Edward needed to fragment the
barons and secure public support. Tension between the magnates
and royalists continued to escalate and climaxed in the bloody de-
feat of the baron party in 1322. Parliament was summoned to York
on May 2, 1322. The product of the Parliament, the so-called Stat-
ute of York, denounced the restraints placed upon the sovereign
power by the Ordinances, noting that they had led to "Troubles and
Wars . . . whereby the Land hath been in Peril." It therefore was
enacted by "the King, . . . Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and the
whole Commonalty of the Realm" that the Ordinances cease to be
part of the law of the land, and that the order in effect prior to the
Ordinances be reconstituted."8
The next attempt by Parliament to curtail the liberal clemency
policy of the Crown came in 1328 in the Statute of Northampton:
38. The Statute continued:
And that for ever hereafter, all manner of Ordinances or Provisions, made by
the Subjects of our Lord the King or of his Heirs, by any Power or Authority
whatsoever, concerning the Royal Power or our Lord the King or of his Heirs,
or against the Estate of our said Lord the King or of his Heirs, or against the
Estate of the Crown, shall be void and of no Avail or Force whatsoever; But the
Matters which are to be established for the Estate of our Lord the King and of
his Heirs, and for the Estate of the Realm and of the People, shall be treated,
accorded, and established in Parliaments, by our Lord the King, and by the
Assent of the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and the Commonalty of the Realm;
according as it hath been heretofore accustomed.
Statute of York, 15 Edw. 2 (1322). Stubbs has implied that the Statute of York meant that
the full cooperation of all the estates of Parliament was "necessary for the establishment of
any measure touching the king and the realm." 2 W. STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF ENGLAND: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 628-29 (4th ed. 1898). J.C. Davies, concurring in
the position advanced by Stubbs, concluded that the Statute "referfred] to matters which
ha[d] a direct bearing upon the whole kingdom, legislation, administration, taxation." J.
DAVIES, THE BARONIAL OPPOSITION TO EDwARD H 515 (1918). Those in accord with Stubbs and
Davies concentrate on the last sentence of the Statute. Wilkinson, however, suggested that
the "annulment of the Ordinances was accomplished in the first paragraphs. Nothing else
was necessary if this annulment was all that Edward required. Nevertheless, there was an-
other paragraph, dealing with a different though related matter." Therefore, according to
Wilkinson, the Statute was more than a simple negation of the Ordinances of 1311. B.
WILKINSON, supra note 34, at 140. Haskins, however, concluded that the statute neither
created any new rights nor denied any existing Parliamentary privilege. This position is
supported by the state of Parliamentary development at the time; Parliament could assert
only that which it had asserted previously. G. HASKINS, THE STATUTE OF YORK AND INTERESTS
OF THE COMMONS 25 (1935).
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Whereas Offenders have been greatly encouraged, because the
Charters of Pardon have been so easily granted in Times past, of
Manslaughters, Robberies, Felonies and other Trespasses against
the Peace; (2) it is ordained and Enacted, That such Charter
shall not be granted, but only where the King may do it by his
Oath, that is to say, where a Man slayeth another in his own
Defense, or by Misfortune .... 1
The number of times the Statute had to be reissued leads one to
believe that it had little, if any, effect on the king's use of the
pardoning power. The first reenactment came only two years later,40
and an act similar to the Act of 1330 was passed in 1336.11 Failures
toughened the language of Parliament, and in 1340, the lawmakers
warned that henceforth no pardon should be granted by the king in
violation of his oath, a fortiori, in violation of the statutes of Par-
liament. If such a pardon were granted, it would "be holden for
none." 2 This statute met with similar failure. Petitions filed in
134743 and 1351"1 also proved ineffective in dissuading the king from
39. 2 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1328).
40. 4 Edw. 3, c. 13 (1330): "Because divers Charters of Pardon have been granted of
Felonies, Robberies, and Manslaughters, against the Form of the Statute lately made at
Northampton, containing that no Man should have such Charters out of the Parliament,
whereby such Misdoers have been the more bold to offend; (2) it is enacted, That from
henceforth the same Statute shall be kept and maintained in all Points."
41. 10 Edw. 3, a. 1, c. 2 (1336).
42. 14 Edw. 3, s. 1,c. 15 (1340).
43. 2 ROTUI PARLIAMENTORUM 172.
AN'RE Seigfir le Roi et son Conseil prie sa Commune, Qu come plusours
murdres, emblers des gentz, roberies, homicidies, et ravissementz des femies,
et autres felonies et mesfaitz, sont faitz et meintenuz en Roialme saunz nombre,
at tantz favorez p Chartres de pdoun et procurez deliverance, les mesfesours,
ne meintenous de Ia Lei, n'ount cure, ne Ia doutent, a grante Destruction du
Poeple. Pleise a -ire Seignur le Roi tiel remeidep Estatut ordener, itiels mesfe-
sours et meintenours p null des causes susdites peussent estre comfortez
n'embaudez. Et TCharires des pdouns ne soient as tiels grantez faunz assent
du Parlement.
(To Our Lord the King and his Council the Common petitions, that since
several murders, kidnappings, robberies, homicides, and rapings of women, and
other crimes and misdeeds, are done and maintained in the Realm without
number, and so much favored by Charters of Pardon and procured deliverance,
that the evil doers, and [those] who do not uphold the Law, have no concern
and do not fear it [the Law], to the great Distress of the People. May it please
our Lord the King to ordain by Statute such a remedy, that such evil doers and
[non-]upholders may not by any of the abovesaid causes be comforted or em-
boldened. And may Charters of Pardon not be granted to such without the
assent of Parliament.)
Id.
44. Id. at 229.
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using the power so abusively. Parliament recognized that this evil
was not merely an abuse of the royal attribute of mercy or a defect
of the ordinary process of justice, but a regularly systematized
perversion of prerogative by which the great people of the realm,
whether as maintainers or otherwise, attempted to secure for their
retainers and for those who could purchase their support an exemp-
tion from the operation of the law. Responding to this new perspec-
tive, Parliament enacted a statute requiring that in every charter
of pardon granted as a result of the request of an intermediary, his
name and the purpose for the pardon were to be recorded, and if the
stated cause subsequently was found to be untrue, the charter was
void. Upon discovery of a false suggestion, the justices before whom
the feigned pardon was pleaded inquired into all preceding charters
granted by the king at the request of the tainted advocate. All future
charters procured by the intermediary's services were likewise sus-
pect. 5
ITEM prie Ia dite Commune, & come altre foith feust ordeignep Estatut, Qe
nules Chartres de pdouns de mort de homme, ne de felonies nortories, ne ser-
roient grantez a nulli, sinoun en cas ou le Roi poist sauver son Serement; ni-
entcontresteant cel Estatut, diverses Chartres ount estre grauntez au diverses
c~munes Felonues et Murdrers; et auxi bien en general come en cas especial; et
a lea uns deux Chartres outriez; Par quoi lea Manfaisours sount trop esbaudes
de meffaire, en espoir de tieux pdouns avoir,-4 son poeple est en grant affray de
vivre: Et pur la multitude des tiels Chartres les gentex de Countees ne osent
lea Malfeisours enditer, a grant esclaundre du Roi, et au grant meschief du
poeple. Par quoi plese a ifre Seigir le Roi,-4 Tiels Chartres ne soient desormes
gruntes au communs Malfesours et Mourdrours, ne a nulli, sinoun en cas Ia
ou nre Seign'le Roi purra sauver son Serement et sa Conscience: Mes tiels
communes Meffaisours et Mourdrours estoisent a Ia Lei, pur la quiete de sa
Commune et Ia Pees meintener.
. (Likewise, the said Commons petitions, that as was formerly ordained by
Statute, that no Charters of Pardon be granted to anyone for homicide or for
notorious crimes, except in cases where the King can "protect" [(take back)]
his Oath; notwithstanding this Statute, diverse Charters have been granted to
diverse common Criminals and Murderers; and in general as well as in special
cases; and to some two Charters have been given; with the result that the Evil
doers are very much emboldened to do mischief in the hopes of having such
Charters of Pardon, that his [the King's] people is very hard put to live: And
because of the multitude of such Charters the people of the Counties do not dare
accuse the Evil doers, to the great scandal of the King and to the great misfor-
tune of the people. Wherefore may it please our Lord the King, that such Chart-
ers be not granted henceforth to common Evildoers and Murders, nor to anyone,
except in cases where our Lord the King will be able to "protect" [(take back)]
[his oath].)
Id.
45. A Statute Against Annullers of Judgments of the King's Court, 27 Edw. 3, s. 1, c. 2
(1353).
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In 1389, Parliament again aimed its attention at the pardon-
broker. A petition recorded in that year requested that if any arch-
bishop or duke petitioned for a pardon, he should forfeit £1000; a
bishop or an earl should forfeit 1000 marcs; a prior, baron, or ban-
neret should forfeit 500 marcs; and a clerk, knight bachelor, or per-
son of lesser estate should forfeit 200 marcs or be imprisoned for one
year. The king answered that he would "saver sa liberte et regalie
comes ses progenitours ount faitz devaunt ce heures (protect his
liberty and royal prerogatives as his forebearers have done up to
now)."" Although there was a modified assent,47 the Act was re-
pealed three years later."In the 1389 act, Parliament tried to debase the king into a more
prudent posture. The statute sought to remove from the purview of
the clemency power pardons granted for "outrageous" crimes. With
the unwilling support of Richard II, it was enacted that "no Charter
of Pardon from henceforth shall be allowed before any Justice for
Murder, or for the Death of a Man slain by Await, Assault, or
Malice prepensed, Treason, or Rape .... unless the same Murder,
Death . . . [etc.] . . . be specified in the same Charter . . .
Parliament could not conceive that the king would ever pardon an
offense by name that was attended by such aggravations,5" but the
check proved ineffective on an executive with power to dispense as
well as power to pardon. Parliament soon realized the futility of the
Act, and in 1403 enacted a statute affixing a financial penalty on
the intermediary.5
Parliament was equally unsuccessful when it attempted to control
the use of the pardoning power through restrictions on the benefici-
ary of the executive gift. For example, a statute passed in 133652
mandated that the validity of a pardon would expire unless the
grantee could find six mainpernors within three months who would
enter into bonds for his good behavior. This statute also was ren-
dered defunct by the executive's dispensatory power.53
46. 3 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 268.
47. 13 Rich. 2, s. 2, c. 1 (1389).
48. 16 Rich. 2, c. 6 (1392).
49. 13 Rich. 2, s. 2, c. 1 (1389).
50. E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 236 (London
1747).
51. 5 Hen. 4, c. 2 (1403). The statute stated inter alia that "if he to whom such Charter is
granted, after his Deliverance becometh a Felon again, that . . . same Person which did so
pursue for his Charter, shall incure the Pain of an C 1. to be levied to the King's Use."
52. 10 Edw. 3, s. 1, c. 3 (1336).
53. The statute was repealed in 1694 (5 & 6 W. & M. c. 13).
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There were limitations to the king's power to pardon. These limi-
tations were delineated by the rule that the king could not interfere
with the rights guaranteed to third persons.54 In 1673, a judicial
tribunal recognized the traditional parameters on the royal preroga-
tive. 55 The court noted that historically the king could not dispense
with laws that affected a man's life, liberty, or estate; the king could
not grant a man a dispensation to annoy or damage another; he
could not grant a man a dispensation to avoid doing that which he
was required to do for the public benefit; and he could not grant a
dispensation that would deprive a third party of an advantage that
would have accrued to that party had the dispensation not been
granted." Thus even a royal pardon could not relieve one convicted
of homicide from prosecution by a revengeful kinsman or from the
payment of reparations to the kinsman. 7 The kinsman had the
right of appeal.5" The pardoning power could not, therefore, deprive
a private individual of his remedy at law.5"
Relatively little control of the king's power to pardon was at-
tempted during the reign of the Tudors. On the contrary, in 1535
Parliament solidified the king's jurisdiction over the power to par-
don by removing the clemency power from all others:
Where divers of the most ancient Prerogatives and Authorities
of Justice appertaining to the Imperial Crown of this Realm have
been served and taken from the same by sundry Gifts of the
King's most noble Progenitors, Kings of this Realm, to the great
Diminution and Detriment of the Royal Estate of the same and
to the Hinderance and great Delay of Justice; . . . be it enacted
by authority of this present Parliament that no person or persons
of what estates or degrees soever they be of, from the first day of
July which shall be in the year of our Lord 1536 shall have any
power or authority to pardon or remit any treasons, murders,
54. The origin of this rule probably had its legal basis in Chapter XXIX of the Magna
Charta, which guaranteed against the divestment of property without a lawful judgment by
a "jury" of one's peers or by the law of the land. If a pardon worked to deprive a third person
of his property, the Magna Charta would apply. 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1224).
55. Thomas v. Sorrell, 89 Eng. Rep. 100 (1673).
56. Id. at 100-01.
57. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD
I 482-83 (2d ed. 1898).
58. The word "appeal" in this context is not used in its modern connotation, but signifies
an accusation or challenge, that is, an original suit brought by an individual because of his
own peculiar damage rather than for an offense against the public.
59. See 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 60, § 17, at 129 (London
1716). See also N. HURNARD, supra note 21, at chapter VII.
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manslaughters or any kinds of felonies.., or any outlawries for
such offenses afore rehearsed, committed, perpetuated, done, or
divulged, or hereafter to be committed . . . by or against any
person or persons in any parts of this Realm, Wales, or the
Marches of the same; but that the King's Highness, his heirs and
successor Kings of this realm, shall have the whole and sole power
and authority thereof united and knit to the Imperial Crown of
this Realm, as of good right and equity it appertaineth, any
grants, usages, prescriptions, act or acts of Parliament, or other
things to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.
Thus, prior to the seventeenth century, the English monarch's
power to pardon was absolute. His royal prerogative was as sacred
to him as the "rights of Englishmen" were to the individual; so
sacred, in fact, that not even the king could diminish the royal
tradition."' Whatever part of the power was diminished was com-
pletely restored by the 1535 Act. Not until the late seventeenth
century was the attack upon the power so great and the relative
power of the Parliament so increased that an enduring limitation on
the power was established.
The Impeachment of Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby
The greatest constitutional crisis involving the executive power to
pardon was occasioned by the impeachment of the Earl of Danby,
60. Act for continuing certain liberties in the crown, 27 Hen. 8, c. 24, cl. 1 (1535).
Although the centralization of the pardon power appears as part of a statute that attempted
to reform the judicial system, one can conclude that this pardoning clause was directed
primarily against the Catholic Church because the Church was the greatest loser in the
restructuring. This Act culminated several attempts to thwart the Church's power to pardon.
The short Parliament of 1529 was responsive to the anticlerical mood of the country, see 1
W. COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 501-07 (London 1806), and enacted a series
of laws restricting the economic advantages of the clergy. See 21 Hen. 8, c. 5, c. 6, c. 13 (1529).
Dissatisfied by these meager measures, the Parliament of 1532 continued the attack on the
financial base of the clergy by initiating a bill to enjoin the payment of Annates to Rome, I
H.L. JOUR. cxxxiv-cxxxvi, and also presented a petition condemning the "unjust" heresy trial.
The Commons further denounced the convocation's power to enact canon law repugnant to
the laws of the realm, thereby disminishing the royal prerogatives. As a result, new canons
could be enacted only with consent of the king; furthermore, all canon law was to be reviewed
by a committee appointed by the king. 25 Hen. 8, c. 19 (1533).
In 1534 the Act of Annates, the "Bill for the First Fruits, with the Yearly Pensions to the
King," was passed. 26 Hen. 8, c. 3 (1534). More importantly, the Act of Supremacy was
passed, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1534), fortified by the Statute of Treason which made it high treason
to deny the king's supremacy "by words or writing, or by craft imagine." 26 Hen. 8, c. 13
(1534). The Church, under attack, could not retain a power to pardon.
61. See 3 EYRE OF KENT, 6 & 7 EDWARD 2 (1313-1314), in 8 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD 11 172-
73 (1913).
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Thomas Osborne, Lord High Treasurer of England from 1673 to
1679. The resolution of the constititional question raised by the
Danby impeachment gave form to the pardoning power for almost
three centuries.
The resolve to impeach Danby of high treason and other high
crimes and misdemeanors was taken by the Commons on December
20, 1678.2 The impetus for the impeachment proceedings was the
revelation of a letter from Danby to Montague, the English minister
at the Court of Versailles, written only five days after passage of an
appropriation act to raise supplies for conducting a war with France,
empowering Montague to make an offer of neutrality between
France and Holland for a price of 600,000 livres . 3 Danby's actions
were only ministerial. Charles II appeared before the House of Lords
March 22, 1679 and testified to Danby's innocence by informing the
Lords that the letter to Montague had been written at his direction.
The word of Charles II was tainted. The underlying reason for the
impeachment was no doubt the suspected pro-French, pro-papist
proclivities of the king and his entourage. But only the prejudi-
ciously blind members of Parliament could have believed that
Danby was pro-papist, though many rightly suspected Charles, and
even more feared that James was so inclined. 4 Because the King
was beyond reach,6" Parliament settled for the apologist of the pre-
rogative and the skillful manager of finance. Members of Parlia-
ment were not to be persuaded by the argument that Danby was
acting merely as a faithful servant. Englishmen had long come to
detest Danby for blindly following the commands of a king whose
policies were incongruent with the notion of "constitutional bal-
ance.""6
62. For the Articles of Impeachment presented against Danby, see 4 W. COBBETr, supra
note 60, at 1067-69.
63. See 2 G. BURNET, HISTORY OF His OWN TIME 178 (Edinburgh 1823).
64. 1 A. BROWNING, THOMAS OSBORN, FIRST EARL OF DANBY AND DUKE OF LEEDS: 1632-1712
324-25 (1951).
65. Joseph Chitty has observed that "the law supposes it impossible that the King himself
can act unlawfully or improperly. It cannot distrust him whom it has invested with supreme
power: and visits on his advisors and ministers the punishment due to the illegal measures
of government." J. CHIrry, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN AND
THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 5 (1820).
66. Sir Robert Howard wrote: "If obedience is the excuse of all ill acts, it ceases to be a
good duty." Sir Philip Warwick noted: "If the Prince's own counsels cast what is settled into
danger, or make it to be obtained by extremities (though not illegalities) upon his own
subjects, a good man would rather make his retreat and die obscurely than see His Majesty
and his country run a great risk." Reprinted in C. ROBERTS, THE GROWTH OF RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT IN STUART ENGLAND 223 (1966).
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On the same day Charles admitted ordering Danby to send the
letter, he informed the Lords that he had issued Danby a royal
pardon." The scope of the prerogative of mercy became crucial:
Could an impeachment be prevented by a pardon? To the list of
those who were determined to find Danby guilty (those who found
fault with his reforms at the Treasury and his administration of
finances, those who viewed his conduct of foreign affairs as de-
signed for the profit of the Crown rather than as a means to check
the French, and those whose hatred stemmed from the "normal"
political jealousies)"8 was added a fourth class-those who were in-
terested in a more balanced government.
The members of Parliament who believed that the power of
impeachment was a means to establish a better government were
ready to force the constitutional confrontation. For them, impeach-
ment had become the method whereby the most powerful aides of
the Crown were brought to their knees before the Lords. Mr. Ben-
nett remarked that if Danby were unpunished, "it will always be
thus, whilst after an Impeachment of High Treason, any man
should go at large. It was for the safety of the King and the Nation,
that a Minister be afraid of this House." 9 Sir Thomas Clarges
feared that because those about the king "ha[d] his ear and
represent[ed] things to him," then "not two or ten [could] protect
the king" if such men could intercept the king's grace." Sir Francis
67. Browning, in his biography of Danby, claims that, characteristically, Danby never
would have stooped to a pardon. Had he desired clemency, he could have secured a pardon
the previous December when the Montague attack was imminent. The pardon, Browning
suggests, was the king's contribution to the resolution of a difficult problem. Charles was
aware that hearings into Danby's conduct would produce numerous disclosures regarding the
bribes he was receiving from the French. 1 A. BROWNING, supra note 64, at 317 n.1. See also
Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 130-31 (1956).
The pardon itself was issued in an unusual manner. It was kept secret, for it was doubtful
whether the normal chain of ministers would have concurred in its issuance. All preliminary
offices were by-passed. When the king summoned Lord Chancellor Finch to affix the Great
Seal to the pardon, Finch refused and the king commanded Finch's secretary to do so. At
the debates that followed, Sir Harbottle Grimstone suggested that because of the irregular
manner in which the pardon was obtained, it was null and void. 7 A. GREY, DEBATES OF THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS 176 (London 1763). Sir Thomas Clarges insisted that the law did not
permit the king to do any ministerial act; thus the pardon was invalid. C. ROBERTS, supra
note 66, at 225. See also 7 A. GREY, supra, at 183-84 (remarks of Mr. Vaughn). During the
debates, several moved that the pardon should not be attacked on the basis of irregularity,
but rather on the illegality of any pardon that attempted to frustrate an impeachment.
68. 7 A. BROWNING, supra note 64, at 300.
69. 7 A. GREY, supra note 67, at 20.
70. Id. at 23.
1977]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Winnington continued the argument and added that "[i]f such
great men exorbitances with Pardon, it takes away culpa as well as
pena. There's an end of all Justice among men if such Pardons are
allowed."'" Colonel Titus, following the theme of equal justice, pre-
dicted that if the Danby pardon were pleaded to the House of Com-
mons and made valid, "ours will be like the Athenian Laws, to catch
flies, while wasps and hornets break out."72 In response to an appeal
from the king, Mr. Booth observed: "The King has told us, that it
is usual for him to pardon his servants when he discharges them,
etc. If it be the custom, it is an ill one, and the worst that it can
be. 73 Others feared that pardons would silence all testimony and
thus suppress the truth of any plot.74 Parliament presumed that a
sovereign would benefit by a complete investigation; if the evidence
supported the charge against his heretofore trusted servant, the king
would abandon him. One member suggested that this use of the
king's mercy was a violation of his duty to be merciful to his peo-
ple. 5 Others feared the precedent such a pardon would establish.76
Suggesting that the pardon was contrary to abstract concepts of
justice, however, would not stop the pardon. The Commons had to
find something illegal about it to preserve the constitutional integ-
rity of the House and the concept of accountability before that body.
Sir John Knight thought that the pardon was pleaded at the wrong
time.77 To this Mr. Sterne commented: "We have spent much time
in talking of the Treasurer's Pardon. Everyone knows the king's
power of pardoning [is unlimited]; in cases of appeal only ex-
cepted; but if you will have a Bill to restrain the power in them, that
may prevent it for the future."" But there were members of Parlia-
ment who thought the future too far off, and Danby had many
enemies. According to Barillon, Charles would have surrendered the
power to pardon, in principle, if thereby he could prevent Danby's
71. Id. at 134.
72. Id. at 135.
73. Id. at 21. Indeed, it was common during the reign of Charles II for a statesman to take
out a pardon upon his departure from office. All of the members of the "Cabal" had done so
before meeting with Parliament in 1673.
74. Id. at 24 (remarks of Mr. Harbord).
75. Id. at 30 (remarks of Mr. Vaughn).
76. Id. at 136 (remarks of Mr. Sacheverrell). See also id. at 174-75 (remarks of Mr. Player).
77. Knight argued that "[wihen a man comes to be tried, then is his proper time to plead
his Pardon. This man must come to be tried, to show the world, how ill a minister he has
been to the king." Id. at 21.
78. Id. at 24.
[Vol. 18:475
PRESIDENT'S PARDONING POWER
trial. Barillon wrote: "The King agrees to a law by which those
impeached in the future may have no pardon, if only Danby's is
allowed.""9 Parliament finally agreed that the strongest position to
take was based on the lack of precedent for such a pardon, and thus
concluded that a pardon would be no bar to impeachment."' The
Committee presented the following reasons:
2. The Setting up of a Pardon to be Bar of Impeachment
defects the whole Use and Effect of Impeachments: For should
this Point be admitted, or stand doubted, it would totally dis-
courage the Exhibiting any for the future; whereby the chief In-
strument for the Preservation of the Government would be de-
stroyed, and consequently the Government itself ....
And, without restorting to many Authorities of greater Anti-
quity, the Commons desire your Lordships to take notice, with
the same Regard they do, of the Declaration which that excellent
Prince King Charles the First,["] of blessed Memory, made in
his Behalf, in Answer to Nineteen Propositions of both Houses of
Parliament: wherein, stating the several Parts of this regulated
Monarchy, he says, "The King, the House of Lords, and the
House of Commons, have each particular Privileges:" And,
amongst those which belong to the King, he reckons Power of
Pardoning: After the Enumerating of which, and other of his
Prerogatives, he said, ... That "the Prince may not make use of
this high and perpetual Power, to the Hurt of those whose Good
he hath it; and make use of the Name of publick Necessity for
the Gain of his private Favourites, to the Detriment of his
People."
The House of Commons (an excellent Conserver of Liberty) is
solely interested with the First Proposition concerning the Levies
of Monies, and the Impeaching of those, who, for their own Ends,
though countenanced by any surreptitiously gotten Command of
79. C. ROBERTS, supra note 66, at 235 n.2.
80. 9 H. C. JouR. 606: "We find no Precedent, that ever any Pardon was granted to any
Person impeached by the Commons of High Treason, or other High Crime, depending the
Impeachment."
81. The Commons were here referring to the same Charles I who was the subject of Sir R.
Philips' attack in Parliament in 1628:
If ever there came here a business of the like consequence, I have lost my
memory: if ever king of England was abused in his mercy, it is our king. What
persons are pardoned? even the greatest enemies to the church and state, that
were standing under the judgment of the parliament, and they are pardoned
between parliaments: . ..You see offenders complained of, and instead of
punishment, grace; the goodness of our king is thus abused.
2 W. COBBgrr, supra note 60, at 458.
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the King, have violated the Law, which he is bound (when he
knows it) to protect; and to the Protection of which they are
bound to advise him, at least not to serve him in the contrary:
And the Lords being interested with the Judicatory Power, are
an excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and the People,
to assist each other against any Incroachments of the other; and
by just Judgment, to preserve that law which ought to be the Rule
of every one of the Three.
Therefore the Power, equally placed in both Houses, is more
than sufficient to preserve and restrain the Power of Tyranny.
3. Until the Commons of England have Right done them
against this Plea of Pardon, they justly apprehend; That the
whole Justice of the Kingdom, in the Case of the five Lords, may
be obstructed and defeated by Pardons of this Nature.
4. An Impeachment is virtually the Voice of every particular
Subject of this Kingdom, crying out against an Oppression, by
which every Member of that Body is equally wounded; And it
would prove a Matter of ill Consequence, That the Universality
of the People should have Occasion ministred and continued to
them to be apprehensive of utmost Danger from the Crown,
whereby they of Right expect Preservation.2
Not all members were satisfied that no precedent for such a par-
don existed. Dissenting from the opinion of the Committee of Se-
crecy's report was Sir John Trevor, who suggested two precedents."
Sargeant Ellis distinguished these pardons because they were issued
subsequent to some judgment or resolution of impeachment.8 ' Sir
Winnington added:
[Glreat men commit great exhorbitances; and when the fact is
proved by the Commons ... that is all the Commons can do, and
the Lords give Judgment thereupon, and if the Party be reduced
to Judgment, a right of his Forfeiture accrues to the King, and
all is vested in the King, and the King may pardon his part. I
conceive, without any scruple, that the Common's right is to have
justice by Trial. As for the Fine of 2000 marks, in Lord Latimer's
Judgment, that came to the King's coffers, and the King may
pardon it."'
Winnington went onto draw an analogy between a prosecution for a
82. 9 H. C. JouR. 633; 13 H. L. JOUR. 592-93.
83. 7 A. GREY, supra note 67, at 153-54.
84. Id. at 154.
85. Id. at 155.
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felony and an impeachment proceeding. If a king could not deprive
a private person of his remedy at law, then he obviously did not have
the power to arrest an impeachment at the suit of the whole Com-
mons of England. 6
Prior to the Danby impeachment, the king's prerogative of mercy
always had been known to be absolute. 7 Although Parliaments had
tried often to restrain the power, they always had failed. No act on
the statute books limited the royal attribute of mercy in cases of
impeachment." Advocates, such as John Trevot,11 of the position
that no act could be found that might limit pardons in cases of
impeachment were ignored. Political passions would not hear legal
arguments in the Commons.
The Lords were much less excited by the pardon.'" Whereas the
Commons on May 9, 1679, had voted not to allow Danby's lawyers
86. Id. at 155-56.
87. By definition, prerogative was the king's "power to do all things which were not ex-
pressly forbidden him by law .... " G.B. ADAMS, supra note 31, at 78.
88. The issue of pardon in bar of impeachment, however, had been debated twice before
in the Parliament. In 1348, Parliament investigated fraudulent merchants and requested that
no pardon be granted them. I ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 438. This is the first time the word
"impeachment" is found on the Rolls of Parliament. At that time, and at the time of the
Danby pardon, impeachments were considered indictments for offenses against the king. See
C. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 1603-1714 60-66 (1961). In 1376, the following entry
appeared on the Rolls of Parliament:
Item prie la Commune a fire dit ST le Roi, 4 nule Pardon soit grante a nully
persone, petit ne grande, q'ont este de son Conseil et serementez, et sont empes-
chez en cest present Parlement de vie ne de membre, fyn ne de raunceon, de
forfaiture des Terres, Tenemenz, Biens, ou Chateux, lesqueux sont ou serront
trouez en aucun defaut encontre leur ligeance, et Ia tenure de leur dit serement;
mais q'ils soient duement puniz felonc leur desert: Ne q'ils ne sorront jammes
Conseillers ne Officers du Roi; mais en tout oustez de Ia Courte le Roi et de
Conseil as touz jours. Et sur ceo soit en present Parlemnet fait Estatut s'il plest
au Roi, et de trouz autres en temps a venir en cas semblable; pur profit du Roi
et de Roialme.
(Likewise the Commons petitions our said Lord the King, that no Pardon be
granted to any person, great or small, who have sat on his Council and sworn
an oath, and who are seized by this present Parliament of life or of member [of]
money or of real estate, of confiscation of Lands, Possessions, Goods, or Castles,
and who are or will be found in any breach of their allegiance and the keeping
of their said oath; but let them be duly punished according to their deserts: Nor
will they ever be Counselors or Officers of the King; but completely removed
from the King's Court and from the Council forever. And concerning this, let a
Statute be made in the present Parliament, if it please the King, and of all
others in similar cases in the future; for the profit of the King and his Realm.)
2 RoTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 355.
89. 7 A. GREY, supra note 67, at 136.
90. See L.O. PIKE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 223-34 (1894).
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to argue the validity of the pardon, 91 the Lords ordered the debate.
Thus Danby's attorneys were placed in the precarious position of
either violating the will of the Commons or acting contrary to the
order of the Lords. 2 Infuriated by the attitude of the Lords, the
Commons passed a series of resolutions to give effect to their own
position .9
This was not the first time the two Houses had clashed over the
Danby pardon. In late March the Lords attempted an alternative
solution to the constitutional crisis by voting a bill of banishment.
The Commons were unwilling to let Danby off so readily, and on
April 1 voted that Danby surrender himself by the tenth of the
month. 4 The issue was resolved in favor of the lower House whose
argument centered on three points:
1) That Banishment is not the Legal Judgment in case of high
Treason. And the Earl of Danby being Impeached by the Com-
mons of high Treason, and fled from Justice, hath thereby confest
the charge and therefore ought to have Judgment of high Treason
for his Punishment.
2) That Banishment being not the Punishment the law inflicts
upon those Crimes; the Earl of Danby might use this remission
of his Sentence, as an Argument, That either the Commons were
distrustful of their Proofs against him, or else that the Crimes are
not in themselves of so high a Nature as Treason.
3) That the Example of this would be an encouragement to all
Persons that should be hereafter Impeached by the Commons, to
withdraw themselves from Justice, which they would always be
ready to do if not prevented by a Committment upon their Im-
peachment, and thereby hope to obtain a more favorable Sen-
tence in a legislative way, than your Lordships would be obli-
gated to pass upon them in your judicial capacity.
5
91. See 9 H.C. JOUR. 614-18. See also 13 H.L. JOUR. 555-56. The Commons resolved that
no commoner (thus peers were excluded) should consider the pardon valid, and that any
"person so doing shall be accounted betrayers of the liberties of the Commons of England."
92. Roberts suggests four reasons for the more liberal attitude on the part of the Lords: a
sense of their responsibility as judges of the highest court of the land, a reverence for the high
estate of the king, a distrust for popular causes, and a belief that they might someday be
appointed ministers of the king, and thus might also need his royal mercy. C. ROBERTS, supra
note 66, at 220-21.
93. For example, they voted that a joint committee rather than a committee of the upper
House should arrange Danby's trial and that the Bishops, who had a stronger attachment to
the Crown, should not participate in the vote on the legality of the pardon because the issue
tangentially affected "life or limb." (Almost two-thirds of the Lords voted to allow the
Bishops to participate). Id. at 221.
94. See 9 H.C. JOUR. 578-81; 13 H.L. JouR. 471-81.
95. F. SMITH, DEBATES ... RELATING TO . .. THOMAS, EARL OF DANBY 1005 (London 1679).
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The Lords were forced to acknowledge "that Banishment [was
.. .not the legal judgment in any case whatsoever." However,
they saw "no reason why the Legislative Authority should always
be bound to act to the utmost Extent of their Power" and they
offered to assure that Danby's pardon could not be used as preced-
ent for future cases of the kind."6 The Commons had the strongest
legal position in the battle, but before a clear victor could be de-
clared, Charles prorogued Parliament. Although Charles did not
wish to lose a trusted and effective servant, Danby was not worth
another civil war. The unlimited power of pardon was at stake, not
the life or death of Danby. Danby was to spend five years in the
Tower, untried, with a full pardon. The impeachment was never
resumed. 7
From the Danby Pardon to 1700
Between 1679 and 1700 the power of pardon was given much
attention. In 1679 Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act,1
8
which applied a minor, but nevertheless the first, effective limita-
tion on the power. Section II of the Act made it an offense (a prae-
munire) for any person causing the King's subjects to be imprisoned
beyond the realm, and prohibited clemency in such cases. In 1686,
however, the absolutist view of the king's prerogative resurfaced in
Godden v. Hales," in which Sir Edward Hales pleaded a pardon to
an accusation of failure to take the oath of supremacy and failure
to receive the sacraments of the Church of England. Lord Chief
Justice Herbert held the pardon valid: "[T]he Kings of England
[are] absolute Sovereigns; . . . the laws [are] the King's laws; ...
the King [has] a power to dispense with any of the laws of Govern-
ment as he [sees] necessary . . . he [is] the sole judge of that
necessity; .. .no act of Parliament [can] take away that power."' 1
Further, in 1689 Parliament dropped a clause from the Declara-
tion of Rights that redefined the responsibility of ministers of state
96. 13 H.L. JouR. 505.
97. Danby was bailed in February, 1684.
98. 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679).
99. 89 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1686).
100. Id. at 1050-51. The decision thus established the supremacy of the dispensing power
over the Test Act, 25 Car. 2, c. 2 (1685). James used this power in an attempt to catholicize
the government. Godden was a pyrrhic victory for James, for the only choice left Parliament
was to force James to vacate the throne. See 5 W. COBBMEr, supra note 60, at 36-111. See also
10 H.C. JoUR. 14-15; 14 H.L. JouR. 110-20.
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and denied them the right to plead the king's pardon in bar of an
impeachment.'"' The Bill of Indemnity, however, did contain a
clause declaring that the king's pardon was no bar to an impeach-
ment. 0 1 The clause was inserted in response to William's appoint-
ment of the Marquis de Carmarthen, who lay under an impeach-
ment, as Lord President of his Council. 03 The Bill, however, failed
to pass the House of Commons. On the third reading of the Bill of
Rights, a group of willful Whigs in the House of Lords attempted
to add a rider declaring null and void any pardon pleadable to an
impeachment. The rider was rejected; 04 the 1688 enactment, how-
ever, did contain the following clauses:
1. That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the exe-
cution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of Parliament,
is illegal.
2. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the
execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed
and exercised of late, is illegal.
0 5
There is a technical distinction between pardon and suspension:
pardon frees the guilty party from the effect of a violation of the law;
suspension makes legal a formerly illegal act. Although pardons
could be exercised to nullify a law, the Act of 1688 eliminated the
loophole Parliament found so frustrating in its early attempts to
limit the pardoning power. 06
The issue of pardon in bar of impeachment finally was resolved
by the 1700 Act of Settlement.07 The Act stated "[t]hat no pardon
under the great seal of England [shall] be pleadable to an impeach-
ment by the commons in parliament."''08 The Act left intact the
power to pardon subsequent to sentence. 09 Clayton Roberts has
101. 4 L. VON RANKE, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 513-14 (1875).
102. 10 H.C. JOUR. 165. See also 9 A. GREY, supra note 67, at 280-86.
103. C. ROBERTS, supra note 66, at 252-53. The Marquis de Carmarthen was none other
than Thomas Osborne. Osborne, as Duke of Leeds, was impeached again in 1695 and charged
with corruption. However, the charge never was carried to completion because the principal
witness fled.
104. 10 H.C. JoUR. 162. See also 9 A. GREY, supra note 67, at 353-55 (especially remarks of
Mr. Clarges).
105. 1 W. & M. c. 36 (1688).
106. See notes 27-53 supra & accompanying text.
107. 13 H.C. JouR. 625; 16 H.L. JOUR. 738.
108. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (1700).
109. This right was exercised by the king in 1716. After six Scottish lords were impeached
and tried, the Lords recommended mercy for those who deserved the king's mercy. The upper
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labeled the Act "tardy and unnecessary, for there existed no likeli-
hood that an impeached minister would ever again rely on the
King's pardon." 0 Twenty-two years is sufficient time for the legis-
lation to be branded "tardy"; "unnecessary," however, it was not.
The British Colonies in America
When England broadened its boundaries to the "New World," the
pardoning power followed. The prerogative was delegated by the
Crown to the executive authority in the colony, with few limitations
on the power. The Virginia Charter of 1609 granted the governor
"full and absolute Power and Authority to correct, punish, pardon,
govern, and rule all such the Subjects of Us, our Heires, and Succes-
sors as shall from Time to Time adventure themselves" into the
colony."' In 1624, Virginia became a royal colony and all executive
authority was placed in the royal governor.
The Charter of New England (1620) was much like the second
Virginia Charter of 1609; "full and absolute Power and Authority to
correct, punish, pardon, govern, and rule" was bestowed upon the
"Council and their Successors, and to such Governors, Officers, and
Ministers, as shall be by the said Council constituted and ap-
pointed.""' Before a government was organized, the Council for
New England was replaced by the Massachusetts Bay Company,
whose 1629 Charter empowered the Governor and Company to exer-
cise "full and Absolute Power and Authority to correct, punish,
pardon, govern, and rule.""' In 1635, the charter was surrendered
to the king." 4 Under Governor Winthrop, however, the Body of
Liberties circumscribed the executive power by giving the governor
/
House affirmed the king's power to pardon in cases of impeachment but said "though clem-
ency is one of the biggest virtues that adorn and support a crown ... [it] should be exercised
with discretion, and only on proper subjects . Three lords were pardoned consequently.
7 W. CoBBErr, supra note 60, at 238.
Power to pardon not pleadable in bar of an impeachment was different from the unre-
strained power. Wooddeson, in lecture, explained that pardon subsequent to impeachment
"comes too late to clear away the consequences of attainder; the blood ceases to be inherita-
ble, and cannot be completely restored but by act of parliament; the king may indeed release
forfeitures and confer new titles, but cannot revive the family honours in their ancient state
of precedence." 2 R. WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATIC VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 615 (London
1792). See also id. at 619.
110. C. ROBERTS, supra note 66, at 303.
111. 7 F. THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS 3800-01 (1909).
112. 3 id. at 1883.
113. Id. at 1858.
114. See id. at 1860-61.
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and deputy governor jointly consenting, or any three Assistants con-
curring in consent, only the power to reprieve a condemned malefac-
tor until the next quarter or General Court. The General Court had
exclusive power to pardon."I Sir Edmund Andros was commissioned
by the Crown in 1688 and was given
full power where [he] shall see cause and shall judge any of-
fender or offenders in capital and criminal matters, or for any
fines or forfeitures due unto us, fit objects of our mercy, to pardon
such offenders and to remit such fines and forfeitures, treason
and wilful murder only excepted, in such case [he] shall likewise
have power upon extraordinary occasions to grant reprives to the
offenders therein until and to the intent our pleasure may be
further known."'
The Charter of 1691 provided for a governor appointed by the king
who represented the Crown in all things in the colony, and thus
dispensed the royal prerogative of mercy.7
Both Baron Baltimore in Maryland"' and Sir Fardinando Gorges
in Maine"9 were given full and absolute power to pardon. In 1664,
Maine was granted to James, Duke of York, who possessed "power
and authority to correct, punish, pardon, govern, and rule."'120 After
1677, Maine was governed by the Charters of New England. The
colonists of both Connecticut' and Rhode Island' provided the
General Assembly with the power to pardon, provided that the gov-
ernor and six executive assistants were present.
The Lord Proprietors of North Carolina were given power "to
remit, release, pardon and abolish (whether before judgments or
after) all crimes and offences whatsoever."' The Charter of 1665
renewed the power. 2 The Fundamental Constitution of Carolina
(1669), written in part by John Locke, empowered the palatine's
court, which consisted of the palatine and seven proprietors, to issue
115. THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1641,No. 72, reprinted in W. WHITMORE, A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH OF THE LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY 49 (1890).
116. 3 F. THORPE, supra note 111, at 1866.
117. See id. at 1870-86.
118. Id. at 1680 (Charter of 1632).
119. Id. at 1629 (Charter of 1639).
120. Id. at 1638.
121. 1 id. at 533-34 (Charter of 1662).
122. 6 id. at 3215 (Charter of 1663).
123. 5 id. at 2746 (Charter of 1663).
124. Id. at 2764.
[Vol. 18:475
PRESIDENT'S PARDONING POWER
pardons.I" The constitution gave the proprietors' court the power to
mitigate all fines and to suspend all executions in criminal causes
before or after sentence.'
The proprietors of New Jersey were authorized in 1664 to pardon
or to command execution of a sentence.'" The Quaker Fundamental
Law of 1676, operating in Western New Jersey, contained a pardon-
ing power clause unique among the colonies:
That all and every person and persons whatsoever, who shall
prosecute or prefer any indictment or information against others
for any personal injuries, or matter criminal, or shall prosecute
for any other criminal cause, (treason, murther, and felony, only
excepted) shall and may be master of his own process, and have
full power to forgive and remit the person or persons offending
against him or herself only, as well before as after judgment, and
condemnation, and pardon and remit the sentence, fine and pun-
ishment of the person or persons offending, be it personal or other
whatsoever.12
The Fundamental Constitution for the Province of Eastern New
Jersey (1683) vested the pardoning power in the twenty-four propri-
etors; eighteen concurring votes were necessary for an effective par-
don. The governor, in conjunction with four proprietors, judges of
the Court of Appeals, could grant a one month reprieve.2 9 In 1702,
New Jersey became a royal colony, and the power to pardon rested
with the royal governor.
William Penn, proprietor of Pennsylvania and Delaware, 3 had
power to "remit, release, pardon, and abolish whether before Judg-
ment or after all Crimes and Offenses whatsoever committed within
the said Country against the said Laws, Treason and willful and
malicious Murder only excepted, and in those Cases to grant Re-
prieves," until the king's pleasure was made known.' 3' The gover-
nors of New York were endowed with similar power.
3
125. Id. at 2776.
126. Id. at 2778. However, see The North Carolina Act of 1749, "An Act to Put in Force in
this Province the several Statutes of the Kingdom of England, or South-Britain .... " which
incorporated 10 Edw. III c. 2 and 12 & 13 Will. III c. 2.
127. 5 F. THORPE, supra note 111, at 2540.
128. Id. at 2551.
129. Id. at 2578.
130. See 1 id. at 557-61 (Charter of 1701).
131. 5 id. at 3038 (Charter of 1681).
132. See J. GOEBEL & R. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 748-59
(1944).
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The power to "sell, impose and inflict, reasonable pains and pen-
alties upon any offender ... and to mitigate the same" was given
the Corporation of Georgia in 1732.1 3 When Georgia became a royal
colony, the pardon power was given the royal governor.
After the Revolutionary War, the states, bound by a weak confed-
eracy, drastically curtailed the powers of their suspect executives.
No national pardoning power existed. Most states provided for the
ascendency of the legislative branch and the executive power to
pardon was weakened. For example, Article XIX of the Georgia
Constitution (1777) provided that "[tihe governor shall, with the
advice of the executive council, exercise the executive powers...
save only in the case of pardons and remission of fines, which he
shall in no instance grant . . . ," though he was given the power to
reprieve a criminal or suspend a fine until the next meeting of the
assembly. 134
The confederation Constitution of Delaware (1776) gave the exec-
utive pardoning and reprieving powers "except where the prosecu-
tion shall be carried on by the house of assembly, or the law shall
otherwise direct, in which cases no pardon or reprieve shall be
granted, but by a resolve of the house of assembly.' 1 35 The Constitu-
tions of Virginia (1776) 1" and North Carolina (1776) 13 contained
similar provisions.
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided that the
"power of suspending the laws, or the execution of them, ought
never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived
therefrom, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legis-
lature shall expressly provide for.'
138
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 allowed pardons only
after conviction and eliminated impeachments from the scope of the
power.3 9 Pennsylvania (1776)140 and New York (1777) 11 were guided
by constitutions that excluded from the purview of pardons cases of
treason and murder, which the governor could reprieve until the
133. 2 F. THORPE, supra note 111, at 770.
134. Id. at 781.
135. 1 id. at 563.
136. 7 id. at 3817.
137. 5 id. at 2791.
138. 4 id. at 2457.
139. 3 id. at 1901.
140. 5 id. at 3087-88.
141. Id. at 2633.
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next session of the legislature. Pennsylvania further excepted cases.
of impeachments.
The 1776 Constitution of New Jersey provided for the annual
legislative election of the governor who, along with the executive
council, composed the court of last resort in all cases of law. This
court was empowered to grant pardons subsequent to condemna-
tion. ' 2
After a long season of irresponsible executive authority in the
realm of, among other things, the power to pardon, the young states
reacted with a variety of restraints on the executive power. Simulta-
neously, forces were mounting in favor of a more centralized gov-
ernment with a strong chief executive.
The Convention of 1787
The debate on the "failure" of the Confederation will not be con-
tinued here.' 3 In 1787 a convention assembled at Philadelphia to
establish a more perfect union. The delegates agreed that the new
government called for a chief executive. Although the major plans
(the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan) did not contain a power
of pardon, Charles Pinckney, Alexander Hamilton, and John Rut-
ledge fought for and won inclusion of a pardoning power. A prelimi-
nary draft of the clause was quite similar to the 1700 Act of Settle-
ment; the power of pardoning vested in the Chief Executive but his
pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment.'
The convention failed to approve a motion introduced by Roger
Sherman to limit the power "to grant reprieves until the ensuing
session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate". 1' 5
George Mason averred that the Senate already had too much power.
A motion to insert "exception in cases of impeachment" after
"pardon" and to remove the words "but his pardon shall not be
pleadable in bar" of an impeachment was passed."l4 Luther Martin
moved to insert "after conviction" after the words "reprieves and
pardons," but withdrew the motion after the persuasive argument
142. Id. at 2596.
143. Compare J. FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1783-1789 (1888) with
M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION
(1950).
144. 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD
AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 380 (J. Elliot ed. 1845).
145. Id. at 480.
146. Id.
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of Mr. Wilson that a "pardon before conviction might be necessary,
in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices."'47 Thereafter Ed-
mund Randolph sought to amend the articles to except "cases of
treason" from the pardoning power.'48 Randolph considered the
power too great to be entrusted to one man because the President
himself might be guilty and the traitors might be his own instru-
ments. During the debates that followed the Constitutional Conven-
tion, Mason elaborated upon the objection: "The President of the
United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardons for
treason; which may be sometimes exercised to screen from punish-
ment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime,
and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt."' 49 In answer to the
objection, James Iredell replied:
Nobody can contend upon any rational principles, that a power
of pardoning should not exist somewhere in every government,
because it will often happen in every county that men are obnox-
ious to a lawful conviction, who yet are entitled, from some favor-
able circumstances in their case, to a merciful interposition in
their favor. The advocates of a monarchy have accordingly
boasted of this, as one of the advantages of that form of govern-
ment, in preference to a republican .... [It is a wise aim], in
forming a general government for America, to combine the ac-
knowledged advantages of the British constitution with proper
republican checks to guard as much as possible against abuses,
and it would [be] . . . strange if [the power of pardon is omit-
ted] . . . ([flt could scarcely be avoided, that when arms were
first taken up in the cause of liberty, to save us from the immedi-
ate crush of arbitrary power, we should lean too much rather to
the extreme of weakening than of strengthening the Executive
power in our own government. In England, the only restriction
upon this power in the King. . . is, that his pardon is not pleada-
ble in bar of an impeachment. But he may pardon after convic-
tion, even on an impeachment; which is an authority not given
to our President, who in case of impeachments has no power
either of pardoning or reprieving). 5 '
The initial part of Iredell's reasoning, the need for flexibility in a
147. Id.
148. Id. at 549.
149. PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 350 (P. Ford ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as PAMPHLETS].
150. Id. at 350-51.
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criminal justice system so that it operates in congruence with the
end of all government - justice, is sound. Today, however, the
criminal justice system of the United States is steeped in flexibility.
At each step in the process, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing,
discretion exists. 5' When the power to pardon first evolved, the
punishment for many crimes was death. In 1787 the situation was
changing; today it is drastically different. In addition, Iredell's par-
enthetical remarks for vesting the power in the Executive are mis-
leading. In England, impeachment extends not only to removal
from office but also to the more severe forms of punishment. The
latter development of the impeachment process empowered the
king, after the Danby affair, with a wide latitude in pardoning.
Thus, because the President may abort any criminal proceeding,
including one that may be subsequent to and directly initiated be-
cause of an impeachment proceeding, the power of the English mon-
arch of the eighteenth century and the power of the President of the
United States are essentially equivalent.'
Iredell continued his faulty analysis by adding:
When a power is acknowledged to be necessary, it is a very dan-
gerous thing to prescribe limits to it .... The probability of the
President of the United States committing an act of treason
against his country is very slight .... Such a thing is however
possible, and accordingly he is not exempt from a trial .... I
entirely lay out of the consideration of the probability of a man
honored in such a manner by his country, risking like General
Arnold, the damnation of his fame to all future ages.... One of
the great advantages attending a single Executive power is the
degree of secrecy and dispatch with which on critical occasions
such a power can act.153
151. One found guilty at the trial level in the United States' court system also is given one
appeal as of right. In England the criminal justice system did not provide for adequate
judicial review of the judgments of criminal courts until 1908. The Criminal Appeals Act of
1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 3, established the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the
method of rectifying any injustice before that time was via a grant of pardon. This was still
a limited appeal, however, though section 19 of the Act gives the Home Secretary the privilege
of referring a case to the Court of Criminal Appeals before considering the desirability of
pardoning. See 0. Marshall, The Prerogative of Mercy, 1948 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 107.
152. It was the more lenient extent of the impeachment power in America that motivated
the insertion of the word "except" for the phrase "in bar of
' noted above. In English law,
although the king could not pardon to block an impeachment, he could pardon subsequent
to impeachment and conviction. In the United States, impeachment extends only to removal
from office; thus there was no humane reason for extending the power to impeachment cases
at all.
153. PAMPHLETS, supra note 149, at 351-52.
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The greatest safeguard of American liberties has been the concept
of "checks and balances." The framers provided for such checks and
limitations on all other powers set forth in the Constitution because
they recognized the "encroaching nature" of power.'54 As Madison
explained, in a government of limited powers "[a]mbition must be
made to counteract ambition."' 5 He continued:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the greatest difficulty lies
in this: you must first enable the government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A depen-
dance on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions. 5 '
Experience, admittedly not available to Iredell, has shown that a
President could partake in a subversion of the Constitution and risk
"the damnation of his fame to all future ages." Iredell also over-
looked the possibility that an ex-President, through the use of the
power in question, exercised by himself before departing from of-
fice,'57 or by his successor, might be exempt from trial. The argu-
ment fails to recognize the disadvantages connected with secrecy
and the pardoning power: "[If the history of civilization proves
nothing else, it proves that where secrecy cloaks the use of power it
also cloaks the abuse of power."'58
Randolph's motion was defeated largely because of the imperfect
reasoning of his colleagues. The power to grant reprieves and par-
dons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment, was ready to be displayed to the states.
There was little discussion of the pardoning power at the state
ratifying conventions. One critic argued that the President not be
given the power;'59 another suggested that pardons for treason
should not be allowed without Congressional consent.' Because the
154. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison).
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 322 (1961) (J. Madison).
156. Id.
157. President Ford revealed in testimony before a House subcommittee that this was a
possibility under consideration by former President Nixon.
158. Clark, The Impact of Mass Communications in America, 1968 ANNALS 68-73.
159. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 497 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (Mr. Mason, Virginia Debates).
160. 2 id. at 408 (Mr. Livingston, New York Debates).
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power could be used before indictment, it was obvious to some that
great opportunities existed for the President, via the pardoning
power, to subvert the Constitution, stop investigations, and thus
avoid detection. Speaking to the people of New York, Alexander
Hamilton 6' attempted to quell those apprehensions:
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate that the benign
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered
or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so
much of necessary severity that without an easy access to excep-
tions in favour of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a counte-
nance too sanguinary and cruel....
The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on
[the President's] sole fiat would naturally inspire scrupulous-
ness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or con-
nivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different
kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from
their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act
of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of
suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On
these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser
of the mercy of government than a body of men .... I shall not
deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in
this particular the concurrence of [the Congress], or of a part of
it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the
society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the
offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of the
act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. And
this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the
connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely ex-
cluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is
not to be doubted that a single man of prudence and good sense
is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives
which may plead for and against the remission of the punish-
ment, than any numerous body whatever .... But the principal
argument for reposing the power of pardoning in . . . the Chief
Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection and rebellion there
are often critical moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to
the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the com-
monwealth; ... The dilatory process of convening the legislature,
161. Hamilton's initial plan was to give the executive "the power of pardoning all offenses
except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate." 1 REconDs
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 292 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
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or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction
to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip
the golden opportunity."2
The power was adopted unchanged. With little discussion, and
arguments not strong enough to meet the test of time, the Philadel-
phia Convention, with the concurrence of the state ratifying
conventions, incorporated into the Constitution, by nondefinitive
language, the presidential power to pardon.
II. THE POWER To PARDON: THE AMERICAN LAW
The Meaning and Operation of the Power
Judicial Interpretation
Because of the imprecise language of Article II, section 2, one is
forced to look to the courts to discover the meaning and operation
of the clause. Although the Constitution confers the pardoning
power on the President in general terms, the judiciary has served as
the supreme interpreter of the scope of constitutional powers' 3 since
Marbury v. Madison.'4 In United States v. Wilson,' Chief Justice
Marshall defined the power:
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (A. Hamilton).
163. After a pardon has been issued by the executive branch, the judicial branch formu-
lates the clemency program, thereby determining the scope of the power. For example, Presi-
dent Lincoln sent a message to a judge in San Francisco on December 15, 1863, informing
him that the amnesty oath, required by his proclamation, was "not for those who may be
constrained to take it in order to escape actual imprisonment or punishment." 6 WAR OF
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES
705 (2d ser. F. Ainsworth & J. Kirkley ed. 1899). Lincoln later remarked that his offer of
amnesty did "not extend to Prisoners of War, or to persons suffering punishment under the
sentence of military courts, or on trial or under charges for military offenses." Id. at 802. A
federal court, however, subsequently extended the proclamation "not only to those who joined
the Rebellion in arms, but those who have been in any way implicated in it." In Re Great-
house, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1061 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 5, 741). Greathouse initiated a habeas
corpus proceeding, claiming that he was entitled to the benefits of the December 8, 1863
proclamation. See text accompanying notes 178-180 infra. In granting the application, Dis-
trict Judge Hoffman observed that the court's "plain duty is to construe the proclamation
like any other public act or law, and to apply to it the well-settled rules of interpretation,
irrespective of any opinion, or even knowledge, of the private but unexpressed intention of
its author." 10 F. Cas. at 1061. Of course, the President had only to issue another proclama-
tion to bring court interpretation in line with his intention. Nevertheless, the example illus-
trates the nature of courts' powers in this area.
164. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
165. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
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The Constitution gives to the President in general terms, "the
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
United States."
As this power has been exercised, from time immemorial, by
the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and
to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we
adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a
pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the
manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail
himself of it.
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power en-
trusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the indi-
vidual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate .... 66
Justice Wayne supplemented the definiton twenty-two years later:
pardon is "forgiveness, release, remission." He further noted that
historically, "a pardon [was] . . . a work of mercy, whereby the
king, either before attainder, sentence, or conviction, or after, for-
giveth any crime, offense, punishment, execution, right, title, debt,
or duty, temporal or ecclesiastical.""' 7
Voicing a strong dissent to the use of English precedent, Justice
McLean noted in Ex parte Wells that "[tihe executive office in
England and that of this country is so widely different, that doubts
may be entertained whether it would be safe for a republican chief
magistrate, who is the creature of laws, to be influenced by the
exercise of any leading power of the British sovereign."' 6 8 McLean
based his dissent on a decision the Court had rendered only five
years earlier when Chief Justice Taney explained:
It is true that most of the States have adopted the principles of
English jurisprudence, so far as it concerns private and individual
rights. And when such rights are in question, we habitually refer
to the English decisions, not only with respect, but in many cases
as authoritative. But in the distribution of political power be-
tween the great departments of government, there is such a wide
difference between the power conferred on the President of the
United States, and the authority and sovereignty which belong
to the English crown, that it would be altogether unsafe to reason
166. Id. at 159-60.
167. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 (1855).
168. Id. at 318.
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from any supposed resemblance between them, either as regards
conquest in war, or any other subject where the rights and powers
of the executive arm of government are brought into question.
Our own Constitution and form of government must be our only
guide.'
Despite this opinion, the courts have looked to English jurispru-
dence for the meaning of a presidential power that corresponds to
a power of the English Crown, 7' including the power to pardon. As
Justice Wayne explained:
At the time of our separation from Great Britain, the power had
been exercised by the king, as the chief executive. Prior to the
revolution, the colonies, being in effect under the laws of Eng-
land, were accustomed to the exercise of it in the various forms,
as they may be found in the English law books .... At the time
of the adoption of the constitution, American statesmen were
conversant with the laws of England, and familiar with the pre-
rogatives exercised by the crown.'
Hence, when the words "to grant pardons" were used in the Consti-
tution, they connoted the authority as exercised by the English
Crown or by its representatives in the colonies.
Because of the emphasis Marshall placed upon grace and the
private character of the presidential action in Wilson, mercy be-
came, in strict legal theory, the reason for a pardon. The Court in
1915 formally adopted Marshall's definition. 7 ' In 1927, however, the
169. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 618 (1850).
170. Because the framers were aware of the constitutional struggles in England at this
time, constitutional history and English precedents are valuable for determining the meaning
of the various clauses of the Constitution. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERI-
CAN REvOLUTION 30-31 (1971). See also C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 188 (1912).
The influence . . . of these English-bred lawyers . . . was most potent. The
training which they received in the Inns, confined almost exclusively to the
Common Law, based as it was on historical precedent and customary law, the
habits which they formed there of solving all legal questions by the standards
of English liberties and of rights of the English subject, proved of immense value
to them when they became . . . leaders of the American Revolution ....
The services rendered by the legal profession in the defense and maintenance
of the people's rights and liberties, from the middle of the eighteenth century
to the.adoption of the Constitution, had been well recognized by the people in
making a choice of their representatives; for of the fifty-six signers of the Decla-
ration of Independence, twenty-five were lawyers; and of the fifty-five members
of the Federal Constitutional Convention, thirty-one were lawyers, of whom four
had studied in the Inner Temple and one at Oxford, under Blackstone . . ..
Id. at 188, 211.
171. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 (1855).
172. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
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Court set aside these elements and provided a more solid base for
the power:
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individ-
ual happening to possess power. It is part of the Constitutional
scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflict-
ing less than what the judgment fixed.'
Incidental Powers
A definition of "pardon" is incomplete without a consideration of
the powers incident to it. One such incidental power is the authority
to issue amnesties.' Prior to the Civil War, the power of the Presi-
dent to grant amnesties was unquestioned. The Civil War and Re-
construction period provided the first controversial exercise of the
Executive power to pardon in the United States. The bounds of the
power were given extensive examination during this period; many
constitutional queries surrounding the pardoning power were
treated by the courts and tested by the Congress.
By 1790, death was the legitimate prescription for treason., The
early act was reinforced on July 17, 1862 by the "Confiscation
Act,"' 76 which provided that "every person who shall be adjudged
guilty thereof, shall suffer death.. .. "It was obvious, however, that
the treason statutes could not be enforced on the scale demanded
by the Civil War. The pardoning power was a necessity in this
season of insurrection and rebellion, as both the executive and legis-
lative branches recognized. In 1863 Congress enacted a law provid-
ing that if a person were sentenced to both pecuniary and corporeal
punishment, "the President shall have full discretionary power to
pardon or remit, in whole or in part, either one of the two kinds of
punishment, without in any manner impairing the legal validity of
the other kind . . . . 77
173. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
174. "Amnesty differs from pardon in that it applies to a whole class of persons or commun-
ities rather than to individuals. It also differs from pardon in that it is granted regardless of
proof of the fact of guilt .. " J. MATHEWS, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 176
(1940). See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
175. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112.
176. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 1, 12 Stat. 589.
177. Act of February 20, 1863, ch. 46, § 1, 12 Stat. 656. In 1861, Congress had passed a
series of acts that substituted punishments other than death for actions that could be con-
strued as treasonous. See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284 (anyone found guilty
of conspiracy to overthrow the government or interfere with the laws to be punished by a fine
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Lincoln intended to use the power only if "the favorable fortunes
of war should promise it some effectiveness in persuading waverers
to resume their former loyalties."'' Lincoln issued the first amnesty
ten months after the Congressional sanction:'
Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the United States, it is
provided that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves
and pardons . . . , except in cases of impeachment;" and
Whereas, a rebellion now exists whereby the loyal state govern-
ments of several states have for a long time been subverted, and
many persons have commited, and are now guilty of treason
against the United States; and
Whereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, laws
have been enacted by congress, declaring forfeitures and confisca-
tions of property and liberation of slaves, all upon terms and
conditions therein stated, and also declaring that the President
was thereby authorized at any time thereafter, by proclamation,
to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing
rebellion in any state or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with
such exceptions and at such times and on such conditions as he
may deem expedient for the public welfare; and
Whereas, the congressional declaration for limited and condi-
tional pardon accords with well-established judicial exposition of
the pardoning power; and
Whereas, with reference to the said rebellion, the President of
the United States has issued several proclamations in regard to
the liberation of slaves; and
Whereas, it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged
in said rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States,
and to reinaugurate loyal state governments within and for their
respective states:
of not less than five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars or imprison-
ment); Act of August 6, 1861, ch. 56, 12 Stat. 317 (anyone guilty of recruiting soldiers or sailors
to serve against the United States to be fined and imprisoned); Act of August 6, 1861, ch.
60, § 1, 12 Stat. 319 (property used for insurrectionary purposes to be seized). The discretion-
ary power of the courts to substitute fines and imprisonment for the death penalty was
subsequently authorized. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 1, 12 Stat. 589.
178. E. McKrrRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 143 (1960).
179. Individual pardons were granted before December 8, 1863. On February 14, 1862,
Secretary of War Stanton, directed by President Lincoln, issued the release of all political
prisoners and other persons held in military custody "on their subscribing to a parole engag-
ing themselves to render no aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States." 6 A COMPILA-
TION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1895, 102-04 (J. Richardson ed.
1896). [hereinafter cited as MESSAGES AND PAPERS].
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Therefore I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States,
do proclaim, . .. to all persons who have, directly or by implica-
tion, participated in the existing rebellion.... that a full pardon
is hereby granted to them and each of them, with restoration of
all rights of property, except as to slaves, and in property cases
where rights of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the
condition that every person shall take and subscribe an oath
180
The proclamation excluded six classes, and in March of 1864,
Lincoln added a seventh class to those excepted.' 8' Most members
of Congress had little quarrel with this proclamation, for as Lin-
coln's private secretary, John Hay, observed, it was within the Con-
stitution and the amnesty clause of the Act of July 17, 1862.182 Lin-
coln's address, however, contained a clause that increasingly con-
cerned the radicals: "Saying that on certain terms, certain classes
will be pardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other
classes or other terms will never be added."' The assassination was
a godsend for many in Congress and in the North. More and more
leaders in the North had become disenchanted with the lenient
policy of Lincoln, and they looked to Andrew Johnson for a more
desirable course.
There was good reason for many to expect Johnson to follow a
hard line toward the South. In the early days of the rebellion he
remarked: "[Wiere I the President . . . I would do as Thomas
Jefferson did, in 1806, with Aaron Burr: I would have them arrested;
and, if convicted, .... by the Eternal God I would execute them."'' 4
In an interview on April 24, 1865, he said:
It is time that our people were taught that treason is a crime, not
a mere political difference, not a mere contest between two par-
ties, in which one succeeded and the other simply failed. They
must know it is treason; for if they had succeeded, the life of the
nation will have been reft from it, the Union would have been
destroyed."'
180. Pres. Proc. No. 11 of Dec. 8, 1863, 13 Stat. 737.
181. Pres. Proc. No. 14 of Mar. 26, 1864, 13 Stat. 741. The Proclamation of December 8,
1863 was limited to those who were yet at large and should come forward and take the oath.
See note 163 supra.
182. LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL WAR IN THE DIARaIES AND LErrEs OF JOHN HAY 131-32 (T.
Dennett ed. 1939).
183. Pres. Proc. No. 11 of Dec. 8, 1863, 13 Stat. 737.
184. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1354 (1860).
185. Quoted in C. CHADSEY, THE STRUGGLE BETwEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND CONGRESS
OVER RECONSTRUCTION 32 (1896).
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This was the record emphasized when, in his brief inaugural ad-
dress, Johnson warranted: "The only assurance that I can give of the
future is reference to the past. The course which I have taken in the
past in connection with the rebellion must be regarded as a guaran-
tee of the future.
186
A month and a half after taking the oath of office, Johnson issued
his first amnesty. It was much like the amnesty proclamation of his
predecessor:
[W]hereas many persons who had so engaged in said rebellion
have, since the issuance of [President Lincoln's] proclamation,
failed or neglected to take the benefits offered thereby; and
whereas many persons who have been justly deprived of all claim
to amnesty and pardon thereunder by reason of their participa-
tion, directly or implied, in said rebellion and continued hostility
to the Constitution of the United States since the date of said
proclamations now desire to apply for and obtain amnesty and
pardon.
To the end, therefore, that authority of the Government of the
United States may be restored and that peace, order, and free-
dom may be established, I, ANDREW JOHNSON, President of the
United States, do proclaim and declare that I hereby grant ...
amnesty and pardon .... 7
Johnson's amnesty doubled the number of excepted classes, but the
proclamation stipulated that special applications could be made to
the President for pardons. Radicals were delighted with the number
of exceptions, for all those the radicals believed should be punished
were excluded from the executive blanket. The large number of
exceptions, however, operating with the legacy of leniency of the
Lincoln Administration, yielded a substantial number of special
pardons. The list of pardons released on July 19, 1867 included 3600
names;' 8 the list issued the following December contained 6400
names.' 9 The radicals soon realized that Lincoln's program was still
in effect.
Not only would a lenient policy allow many to go free whom the
Northern Republicans felt should be punished, but it would permit
former secessionists back into the government. Congress easily
186. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 179, at 305.
187. Pres. Proc. No. 37 of May 29, 1865, 13 Stat. 758.
188. H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 32, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. (1867).
189. H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 16, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
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could keep them from the legislative branches simply by refusing to
seat them,' but that was insufficient for most. The scope of the
exclusion was extended well beyond the Houses of Congress by sec-
tion 3 of the fourteenth amendment:
No person shall be a Senator or a Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil
or military, under the United States, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the
United States, or as any member of any State legislature, or as
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Con-
stitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the ene-
mies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.'
Between the introduction and adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, there were other attempts by the radicals to curtail the scope
of the presidential "general pardons."
Early in 1866, Congress began to question the nature of the presi-
dential pardoning power. On June 18, 1866, the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction issued a report on the effect of the President's clem-
ency program. "2 The Committee concluded that the pardons and
amnesties were undermining the authority and prestige of the fed-
eral government and producing an atmosphere of bitterness and
defiance. On December 4, 1866, Senator Chandler introduced a bill
to repeal section 13 of the Confiscation Act.9 3 The purpose of the
repeal, according to Senator Howard, was to prevent the President
from restoring confiscated property to its former owners who partici-
pated in the rebellion. Senators Johnson and Fessenden argued that
the repeal was at least superfluous and at most self-defeating, be-
cause if the President did not have the power to grant "general
pardons" by the Constitution alone, he was specifically empowered
to grant individual pardons. Further, because the President had ten
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides:
Each house shall be the Judge of the Election, Returns, and Qualifications
of its own Members .... Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence
of two-thirds, expel a Member.
But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (the House has no power to exclude a
member-elect who meets the Constitution's membership requirements).
191. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
192. JOINT COMM. REPORT ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 18 (1866).
193. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1866). See text accompanying note 176 supra.
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days in which to accept or veto a bill, immediate passage could
prompt the President to grant a "general pardon" in the interim,
thus inducing what the repeal was seeking to prevent. Nevertheless,
Chandler insisted on immediate passage of the legislation:
It is alleged that hundreds of millions of dollars worth of property
confiscated under the law have under that section been restored
by the President .... It is alleged that pardons are for sale for
money around the streets of this town by women of at least
doubtful reputation . . . If the President has powers under the
Constitution, let him exercise them; but in God's name give him
no greater power than he possesses under the Constitution, to
exercise as they have been exercised for the last twelve months
194
When asked for the opinion of the Judiciary Committee on the
nature of the presidential pardoning power, Senator Trumbull,
chairman of the Committee, replied that the power of the executive
branch to pardon and grant restoration of property would be as
broad after passage of the repeal bill as before. He acknowledged
that it was beyond the power of Congress to deprive the President
of his prerogative and that pardons could be granted before as well
as after conviction, and further, that they could be absolute or con-
ditional. Nevertheless, he recommended repeal as an expression of
the opinion of Congress and, more importantly, because he consid-
ered the "thirteenth section ... broader than the Constitution; it
authorized the President ... to grant pardon and anmesty .... The
President has already issued general proclamations of amnesty and
pardon; there can be no occasion for the exercise of that power
hereafter . . . 195
Senator Johnson dissented and insisted that the power of Article
II, section 2 of the Constitution was "as comprehensive as the words
can make it." He observed that the Constitution was silent with
respect to the proper form of the presidential power:
194. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1866). The following day, Chandler repeated
his allegation: "[I]t is a notorious fact, as notorious as the records of a court, that pardons
have been for sale around this town, for sale by women and more than one . . . . [Alny
Senator who desires to stop that disgraceful business, desires that the clause be instantly
repealed." Id. at 14. To this Dixon replied that the bill certainly must go to committee, for if
such a charge be true, "I need not say, [it] renders [Johnson] . . . liable to impeachment."
Id. at 15.
195. Id. at 144.
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Whether he is to do it in each particular instance of a man who
has committed an offense, or whether, where there is a class of
offenders, he may do it in some form so as to include the entire
class, the Constitution says nothing about. [W]here the power
is conferred upon him absolutely, in general terms, it is for him
to decide as to the manner in which he will execute it or as to the
number of cases in which he will exercise it; as to the manner,
whether he will execute it by granting it to each one a pardon for
the alleged offense, or to those who may be included in it, whether
he will grant a pardon to the whole collectively .... "
The measure became law on January 21, 1867, without the signature
of the President."' Nevertheless, Johnson was to announce three
more amnesties. 98
This act was not the last attempt by the legislators to deny the
President power to grant "general pardons." The next attack fol-
lowed Johnson's Christmas Proclamation of 1868.199 New life was
given the argument by an end to hostilities. According to Senator
Conkling:
The argument is not that the President of the United States, as
a Commander-in-Chief, or in any other capacity during a war,
may make terms with public enemies or military offenders; but
that in time of peace, as to any felony whatsoever, murder on the
high seas, rifling the mails, or the other acts denounced as crimes
in the national jurisprudence, he may interpose in no case in
particular, but in all cases in general, without in any way indivi-
dualizing them by a public act or edict, in effect by a public law
of amnesty, and forego, and forever bar all prosecutions for past
offenses. °0'
Senator Ferry picked up on the argument two weeks later. He first
drew a distinction between pardon and amnesty by describing am-
nesty as the obliteration of the offense and pardon as forgiveness of
the offense.2"' Senator Ferry further claimed that no President be-
fore Johnson had undertaken to grant a general pardon without the
196. Id. Senator Johnson continued his constitutional analysis in subsequent debates. Id.
at 267-69.
197. Act of Jan. 21, 1867, ch. 8, 14 Stat. 377.
198. Pres. Proc. No. 3 of Sept. 7, 1867, 15 Stat. 699; Pres. Proc. No. 6 of July 4, 1868, 15
Stat. 702; Pres. Proc. No. 15 of Dec. 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 711.
199. Pres. Proc. No. 15, Dec. 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 711.
200. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 169 (1869).
201. Id. at 438.
1977]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:475
prior sanction of Congress. Even Lincoln's pardons, observed the
Senator, were "issued while a law stood upon your statute books
expressly authorizing the President to make them."202 Upon the
repeal, that power, "so far as amnesty was concerned, exercised by
the President, fell with the law, and Andrew Johnson alone among
the Presidents of the United States has ever attempted to issue a
proclamation of amnesty without previous sanction of Congress.''2 3
Senator Ferry's argument was inaccurate. In 1795, Washington
issued a Proclamation of Amnesty to the "Whiskey Rebels" without
legislative sanction;0 4 Adams proclaimed a general amnesty to
Pennsylvania insurgents in 1800;05 and in 1815 Madison granted a
"general pardon" to the Barataria pirates. 0 And, although Lincoln
did have legislative approval for the proclamation of December 8,
1863,207 his proclamation was worded to deny the need for legislative
sanction .20 Further, when the Supreme Court considered Lincoln's
1863 amnesty in United States v. Padelford,201 the Court, too,
seemed to imply that legislative sanction might have been super-
fluous:
This proclamation, if it needed legislative sanction, was fully
warranted by the [Aict of July 17, 1862 .... That the President
had power, if not otherwise yet with the sanction of Congress, to
grant a general conditional pardon has never been seriously ques-
tioned .21
202. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 439 (1869).
203. Id.
204. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 179, at 181.
205. Id. at 303-04.
206. Id. at 558-60.
207. Pres. Proc. No. 11 of Dec. 8, 1863, 13 Stat. 737.
208. Id. See text accompanying note 180 supra. The argument against proof by Presidential
precedent should be noted. To give precedent conclusive weight is to hold that usurpation of
power, if repeated often enough, accomplishes an amendment to the Constitution and a
transfer of power. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 90 (1974). This
merely restates an earlier Court opinion: "That an unconstitutional action has been taken
before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date."
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969). But see Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 27 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 206, 209 (1827) in which the Court noted that the construction of a doubtful and
ambiguous law by those charged with its execution was entitled to great respect. See, e.g.,
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 495 (1914); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
496 (1840); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
209. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
210 Id. at 542 (emphasis supplied). The Attorney General sent President Johnson an opin-
ion stating that "[tihe right and power of the President to pardon and to issue any proclama-
tion of amnesty are derived from the clauses in the Constitution and the Act of Congress [Act
of July 17, 1862] .. 1.." 11 Op. Arr'Y. GEN. 227 (1865). There is evidence, however, that
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Whether the Senate was serious or not, the Judiciary Committee
submitted a report"' accompanied by the following resolution:
Resolved, That in the opinion of the Senate the proclamation
of the President of the United States of the 25th of December
1868, purporting to grant pardon and amnesty to all persons
guilty of treason and acts of hostility to the United States during
the late rebellion with restoration of rights, etc. was not author-
ized by the Constitution or laws. 2'
The Committee relied in part on English law, which seemed to
deny the power to the Crown and grant it to the Parliament. An
examination of the list of early English amnesties quickly reveals
the error in that conclusion."' Moreover, the absence of the word
"amnesty" from Article II, section 2 was convincing proof to some
that the framers intended to withhold the power of amnesty from
the executive office. To illustrate the conclusion, they noted the
words of Chief Justice Marshall that a "pardon ...exempts the
individual . . .from punishment.1
1 4
As noted earlier, the king's prerogative of mercy, including the
"King's most Gracious general and Free pardon" goes back to early
England. In England Parliament shared this power with the king
and its power proceeded from the king. 25 Parliament exercised the
power as it would have exercised any other legislative act via a bill
enacted with the consent of the Crown. Sending a "general pardon"
Johnson himself felt that he was without power to grant amnesty without legislative sanction
and would have vetoed the repeal bill as an unconstitutional infringement on the President's
pardon power had he been more certain of his power. 3 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF
RELEASE PROCEDURES 247 (1939).
211. S. REP. No. 239, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. (1869).
212. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1281 (1869).
213. The King's first general pardon was embodied in the Charta Forestae, 9 Hen. 3, c. 15
(1225). A general pardon was granted to celebrate the fiftieth year of Edward III's reign, 50
Edw. 3, c. 3 (1376), and was confirmed by I Rich. 2, c. 10 (1377). In 1382, the King granted a
pardon to all his subjects after the late insurrection, 6 Rich. 2, c. 13, § 1 (1382), followed by
a "more large Pardon" 6 Rich. 2, c. I, -§ 1 (1382). Charles 11's restoration was accompanied
by a general pardon. Act of Free and General Pardon, 12 Car. 2, c. 11 (1660). In 1672 there
was the Act for the King's Majesties Most Gracious, General and Free Pardon, 25 Car. 2, c.
5 (1672). General pardons subsequently were issued in 1690, 2 W. & M., c. 10, § 1 (1690);
1695, 6 & 7 Will. 3, c. 20 (1695); 1716, 3 Geo. 1, c. 19 (1716); and 1747, 20 Geo. 2, c. 52 (1747).
214. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1883) (emphasis supplied).
215. Chief Justice Holt noted that the king's pardon was as effective as a Parliamentary
pardon; both prevented all corruption of the blood. If, however, the convict had been at-
tainted (condemned or outlawed), his blood was corrupted and could not be purged by
pardon. In such a case only an Act of Parliament could restrore him to blood. Rookwood's
Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 1277 (K.B. 1696).
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with the king's assent affixed in advance to Parliament for endorse-
ment was common" ' because parliamentary sanction enhanced the
benefit of the pardon; if Parliament assented, the pardon did not
have to be pleaded because it was a public act and all courts were
required to take judicial notice of it. Further, parliamentary sanc-
tion could "restore the blood" when corrupted; the king's charter
alone could not.
1 7
By arguing that the Parliament rather than the king had the
power to grant amnesties, the Senate implied that they, rather
than the President, possessed the power. This argument is strange
indeed. It is easier to reason that the framers adopted the theory
of pardon from the English executive's authority and applied that
theory to the President than it is to suggest that the theory fol-
lowed for the legislative body. The power of the legislative body of
England is neither limited by a written constitution nor held in
check by a judicial reviewing power." ' Moreover, the Constitution
of the United States confers on the President the "executive
Power" in undefined terms," 't but the Congressional powers are
carefully enumerated. Article I further provides that Congress is to
exercise only those powers "herein granted.
'20
The Judiciary Committee report was never considered by the
Senate. Solicitor General William Howard Taft, when asked in 1892
for his official advice on the power of the President to grant amnes-
ties, was of the opinion that the President obviously had such power,
for if the President may grant pardons separately to 10,000 individu-
als, which no one doubts he may do, why can he not, by one general
216. Although the basis for ratification is obscure, it slowly became the established
practice. E.g., 51 & 52 Hen. 3, c. 5 (1266); 42 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1368); 1 Rich. 2, c. 2 (1377).
Early Parliaments usually acted as a rubber stamp, but the potential for conflict existed.
After the death of Lord Chancellor Wolsey who stood impeached before the Commons in 1531,
the King had a writ of praemunire entered against the clergy. Because praemunire was a
simple law to apply, laymen were apprehensive that it might be used against them as easily
as it was used against the clergy. Therefore, when the king granted a pardon to the clergy for
1£100,000, 22 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1531), no member of the Commons would vote to confirm the
pardon without an assurance that they too would receive a grant of mercy. The king granted
the Commons a pardon shortly thereafter. 22 Hen. 8, c. 16 (1531). See 1 W. COBETr, PARLIA-
MENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 514-15 (London 1806).
217. See Rookwood's Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 1277 (K.B. 1696); note 215 supra.
218. For a general description of English law, see S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW (1971).
219. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. I states: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America."
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I states: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States ...."
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pardon or amnesty, grant such clemency to those offenders as a
group?2 '
It is most likely, however, that the framers considered the power
to grant amnesties as incidental to the power to pardon. This theory
is bolstered by Hamilton's justification for the existence of the
power in the executive department: "[I]n seasons of insurrection
or rebellion, there are often critical moments when a well-timed
offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquil-
lity of the commonwealth ...."I"
Furthermore, the Supreme Court specifically upheld the Presi-
dent's power to grant amnesties without legislative consent in
Armstrong v. United States.223 By the Abandonment and Captured
Property Act224 Congress provided for the restoration of property lost
during the Civil War upon proof that the claimant had never given
aid or comfort to the rebellion. After Armstrong fled south from the
approaching Union army, her cotton was confiscated. She sought to
recover the proceeds but the Court of Claims, holding that Arm-
strong's flight south evidenced aid to the rebellion, denied her
claim. To the Supreme Court, however, Armstrong's move south
was irrelevant; the Court held that Lincoln's universal and uncondi-
tional amnesty 25 absolved Armstrong of any rebellious act and enti-
tled her to recover the proceeds of her confiscated cotton.2 ' Today
the power of the executive to grant amnesties is established.
By reasoning similar to that which extended the power to pardon
221. 20 Op. Arr'y GEN. 330 (1892). This argument was advanced also by Senator Doolittle
during the Senate debates on the pardon power in 1869. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
169 (1869). Arguably, however, Taft failed to note a difference between the two acts; a pardon
of 10,000 individuals is a series of executive acts whereas the power to grant an amnesty to a
group of 10,000 is a legislative action. See text accompanying note 195 supra.
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 449 (1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis
supplied).
223. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1871).
224. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820.
225, Pres. Proc. No. 15 of Dec. 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 711.
226. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 543 (1869), in which the Court
held that the amnesty "purged [petitioner] of whatever offence against the laws of the
United States he had committed . . .and relieved [him] from any penalty which he might
have incurred."
After this decision, Congress enacted a law disallowing evidence of any pardon or amnesty
in support of any claim in the Court of Claims or appellate court. Ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230 (1870).
The Supreme Court refused to give effect to the act, stating that it was an unconstitutional
attempt "to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court had ad-
judged them to have." United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145 (1871).
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to cover amnesties (the greater includes the lesser), 27 the power to
grant conditional pardons also is considered an incidental power.
The power to grant conditional amnesties probably is also inciden-
tal power although it has never specifically been ruled on by the
courts. However, courts have upheld claims that never would have
been sustained without the operation of a conditional amnesty.22
Indeed, it is unusual for an amnesty not to be granted
conditionally."29
Although the Court qualified Ex parte Wells3 0 in Biddle v.
Perovich,31 it did not overrule the holding of Wells on the basic
issue: Can the President grant a conditional pardon? 32 After receiv-
ing and accepting a conditional pardon, Wells challenged it by
claiming that the Constitution empowered the President to issue
only full pardons. Wells reasoned that attaching the condition was
tantamount to legislating and was therefore a power reserved to a
co-equal branch. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and
held that the power to pardon on condition is incidental to the
general pardoning power.
33
The power to pardon has been held to extend also to granting
commutations 34 and remissions of fines and forfeitures imposed by
the United States. 33 Commutation is the substitution of a lighter
227. See Semmes v. United States, 91 U.S. 21 (1875); Vitale v. Hunter, 206 F.2d 826 (10th
Cir. 1953); Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49 (10th Cir. 1930); In re Ruhl, 20 F. Cas. 1335 (D. Nev.
1878) (No. 12,124).
228. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
229. For a discussion of early English precedent, see 5 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF
THE LAW 292-93.
230. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855). See text accompanying note 172.
231. 274 U.S. 480 (1927). See text accompanying note 173.
232. A conditional pardon is "[a] pardon which does not become operative until the
grantee has performed some specific act, or (one which] becomes void when some specific
event transpires." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
233. The use of the conditional pardon is identifiable in statutory form as early as 1336
(10 Edw. 3, c. 3, repealed in 1694 by 5 W. & M., c. 13), by which beneficiaries of the king's
mercy were required to find sureties for their good behavior. It was used to an excess in
England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, first as a means of colonizing and
later as a tool for manning the navy. 11 W. HoLDwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 570-72,
575-76 (1938). A statistical study has shown that the eighteenth century English criminal law
claimed fewer lives than in earlier periods, in spite of the growth in trade and population,
the increased number of convictions, and the continual creation of new capital crimes. The
decrease was attributed to the "increasing use of the royal pardon, by which transportation
could be substituted for hanging." D. HAY, P. LINEBOUGH, J. RULE, E. THOMPSON, & C.
WINSLOw, ALBIANS FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 22
(1975).
234. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
235. Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474 (1875); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
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punishment for a heavier one. Although for a pardon to be effective
it usually must be accepted, commutation is effective without ac-
ceptance.23 In Chapman v. Scott,37 the President granted a com-
mutation to "time-served" to a convict so that he would be avail-
able for prosecution in a state court on a capital case. The convict
refused the commutation and argued that it was not effective until
accepted, but the court held that a commutation did not require
acceptance:
Although power to commute is logically derivable from power to
pardon, . . . commutation is essentially different from pardon.
Pardon exempts from punishment, bears no relation to term of
punishment, and must be accepted, or it is nugatory. Commuta-
tion merely substitutes lighter for heavier punishment . . . . It
removes no stain, restores no civil privileges, and may be effected
without the consent and against the will of the prisoner."'
Nonexclusivity of the Power
The Supreme Court has held that the power to pardon is not
exclusively vested in the President. 39 The Constitution specifically
speaks of the power, however, in Article II only, and in fact, the
framers even rejected legislative confirmation of the prerogative.240
Further, the Court ratified the exercise of the power by Congress
despite statements in previous opinions that "[t]o the executive
236. In United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall, for
the Court, held that acceptance was necessary. It has been argued that Marshall erred in his
examination of history and that the decision
rested on a misconception of early English decisions which actually turned on
points of pleading. The king's pardon, being a private act of grace, was not a
subject of judicial notice. Under old English rules of pleading, a plea of guilty
waived the pardon, and it could thereafter be availed of. Marshall expanded this
rule of pleading into a substantive rule, that which required acceptance. No
such rule is laid down by any of the English authorities. On the contrary, where
a pardon was properly brought to the attention of the Court, whether by plead-
ing or judicial notice as in the case of a legislative pardon: the convict was not
permitted to waive it.
3 ArrORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY 80 (1939). The distinction between procedural and substantive
law was immaterial if the defendant before the bench pleaded the case with something other
than a pardon. See also 5 M. BACON, supra note 229, at 294: "The party ... must insist on
the benefit of [the King's] . . . pardon; and therefore it hath been held to be error, to allow
a man the benefit of a pardon under the great seal, unless he plead it."
237. 10 F.2d 156 (D. Conn. 1926).
238. Id. at 160, quoting from In re Howard, 115 Kan. 323, 325, 222 P. 606, 608 (1924).
239. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
240. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
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alone is intrusted the power of pardon""'' and that the power is "not
subject to legislative control.
2 2
In Brown v. Walker"' the Court specifically affirmed the power
of Congress to pass acts of general pardon. Brown, the auditor for
the Alleghany Valley Railroad Company, was subpoenaed to appear
as a witness before a grand jury investigating violations of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. When asked if he knew whether or not Alle-
ghany transported coal for the Union Coal Company at prices below
established rates, Brown pleaded the fifth amendment guarantee
against self-incrimination. The Court refused to allow Brown to fail
to testify because an act of Congress afforded him amnesty from
prosecution. According to the act:
[N]o person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and docu-
ments before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedi-
ence to the subpoena of the Commission .... on the ground or
for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him, may tend to incriminate him or sub-
ject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prose-
cuted or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may tes-
tify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise before said
Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of
either of them, or in any such case or proceeding .... "I
The Supreme Court also observed that "if the witness has already
received a pardon, he cannot longer set up his [fifth amendment]
privilege, since he stands with respect to such an offense as if it had
never been committed. 12 45 The Court held that although the Consti-
tution vests the executive with the power to pardon, "this power has
never been held to take from Congress the power to pass acts of
general amnesty."
'2"1
In a government of limited power under a Constitution that care-
fully defines the powers of Congress, advocates of exclusive execu-
tive pardoning power may have difficulty comprehending the
Court's willingness to give the presumption of constitutionality to
241. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871).
242. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (9 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
243. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
244. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443-44.
245. 161 U.S. at 599.
246. Id. at 601.
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the Congressional power advocates and the burden of proof to the
apologist for exclusive presidential power. This is even more diffi-
cult to understand in light of Ex parte Garland,247 in which the
Supreme Court stated:
The Constitution provides that the President "shall have
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
United States except in cases of impeachment" . . . .
The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception
stated .... This power of the President is not subject to legisla-
tive control . . . [and] cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions.24
If the executive issued an amnesty excepting a group of offenders
or attaching a condition to the general pardon and Congress there-
after issued a complete, full, and unconditional amnesty, denying
Congressional interference would be difficult.
In England, Parliamerit held the power concurrently with the king
and a parliamentary pardon was often more beneficial than an exec-
utive charter alone." 9 But Congress, unlike Parliament, is limited
in its powers. The Court in Brown did not take note of the differ-
ence; in fact, it gave little support at all for its conclusion. It relied
heavily on state court opinions and on the opinion of a former Court
in The Laura.250
In The Laura, a revenue statute empowering the Secretary of the
Treasury to remit or mitigate any fine or penalty relating to steam
vessels or to discontinue any prosecution seeking to recover penal-
ties was challenged. It was argued that the presidential power to
grant pardons included the power to remit fines and forfeitures im-
posed for the commission of offenses against, or for violation of the
laws of, the United States. 5' Further, it was argued that such a
power is vested exclusively in the President, and its exercise by any
subordinate officer of the government is an encroachment upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Chief Executive.252
Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, agreed that the power to
remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures was incidental to the power of
247. 71 U.S. (9 Wall.) 333 (1866).
248. Id. at 380, quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
249. See note 215 supra.
250. 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
251. See note 235 & accompanying text.
252. 114 U.S. at 413.
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the President to pardon, but he did not find the power exclusively
vested in the President. The opinion was based on previous practice
and acquiescence in such practice for nearly a century:" 3
[The] practice commenced very shortly after the adoption of
[the Constitution], and was, perhaps, suggested by legislation
in England, which, without interfering with, abridging, or re-
stricting the power of pardon belonging to the Crown, invested
certain subordinate officers with authority to remit penalties and
forfeitures arising from violations of the revenue and customs
laws of that country.
254
The opinion is not well reasoned. It is dangerous jurisprudence for
a court to rely upon past actions that may have been unconstitu-
tional as authority. The doctrine of Powell v. McCormack "[tihat
an unconstitutional action has taken place before surely does not
render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date," ' ,
cannot be overemphasized. Additionally, that the practice began
shortly after the adoption of the Constitution does not strengthen
the Court's argument. The 1797 act was merely legislation enacted
by the same generation divided over the vital issue of judicial re-
view. Finally, that the Parliament vested the power in executive
ministers is completely irrelevant because of the difference between
the two systems.
In addition to these examples of clemency power outside the exec-
utive office, the courts exercise power consanguineous to a power of
pardoning. Although as a general principle the courts have no power
to grant clemency, " ' they do have the power to commute sen-
tences257 and remit fines during the term in which the sentence or
fine was rendered.
253. By an act passed on March 3, 1797, 1 Stat. 506, the Secretary of the Treasury was
authorized to mitigate or remit any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or disability arising from any
law providing for the laying, levying, or collecting of duties or taxes, or any law concerning
the registration and recording of ships or vessels, or the enrolling or licensing of ships or
vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries if in his opinion the same was incurred
without the willful negligence, or fraudulent intention by the person or persons subject to the
same. That act expired on February 11, 1800. It then was renewed without limitation. 2 Stat.
7.
254. 114 U.S. at 414. For the English legislation referred to by Justice Harlan, see 27 Geo.
3, c. 82 (1787); 51 Geo. 3, c. 96 (1811); 54 Geo. 3, c. 171 (1814).
255. 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
256. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
257. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
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The Extent of the Power
The extent of the presidential power must be considered: Which
offenses fall within its scope? The scope of the power, it is submit-
ted, is broad enough to allow the executive to shield himself from
the checking power of the other branches.• 8
First, impeachments are specifically excluded from the scope of
the power. As Chief Justice Story, commenting on the Constitution,
concluded: "[Ilf the power of pardon extended to impeachments,
• ..the latter might be wholly ineffective, as a protection against
political offenses. The Party accused might be acting under the
authority of the President, or be one of his corrupt favorites." '259 One
court has held that the exception in cases of impeachment strength-
ens the argument that the framers meant to include everything
else .20
Secondly, the Constitution also limits the President's pardon
power to offenses against the United States. This clause precludes
the President from pardoning offenses against the individual states
258. Some once viewed impeachment as a check on the pardoning power. In 1867, Repre-
sentative Ashley charged President Johnson with "high crimes and misdemeanors" for
"usurpation of power and violation of law" by "corruptly us[ing] the pardoning power."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1867). After investigation, the Committee on the
Judiciary found no evidence of corrupt use of the power. H.R. REP. No. 7, 40th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1867).
Impeachment is actually no check at all on the powers of the President; it is a check on
the individual President. If convicted, an impeached President is removed from office, but
the powers of the executive branch are left undisturbed. Furthermore, the pardon remains
effective despite removal of the President for issuing it. Once delivered, a pardon cannot be
revoked. In re DePuy, 7 F. Cas. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1869) (No. 3,814). When Oklahoma Governor
Walton was impeached for abusing the pardoning power, the pardons remained in force
despite the abundant evidence of abuse. See 3 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES 150-52 (1939).
It might be asked whether removal via impeachment is a desirable course of action against
a President who issues a pardon because of incompetent advice or through his own misjudg-
ment. Is impeachment probable against an executive who utilizes the pardoning power only
once during his administration, although that act sufficiently disturbs the body politic? Was
impeachment designed to create a sanction for misjudgment or as a means to settle policy
disputes, or was it designed rather for "higher purposes?" Further, if after receiving feedback
from the body politic, the President realizes the folly of his exercise, what can be done about
the pardon? And finally, is it not possible that a President, liable to impeachment for a reason
other than abusive use of the pardon, could, via the power, suppress a thorough investigation?
Lower level accomplices, having behind them the security of the executive office, complete
with the power to pardon, would not need the inducements of Congress to testify. A check
on the power, then, is yet to be incorporated into the American constitutional scheme.
259. I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 172 (1851).
260. United States v. Thomasson, 28 F. Cas. 82 (D. Ind. 1869) (No. 16,479).
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and from intervening in civil suits.2"' The former limitation is based
upon the American federal system; the latter upon accepted histori-
cal limitation. As noted earlier, if a suit was for the king's branch
of a law only and not to the particular damage of any third party,
the king could pardon or dispense; if the suit was not only for the
king's benefit but for the profit or safety of a third person, the king
could not release the party.262 Even if a pardon were granted, it could
not relieve an individual from prosecution by the affected party, or
in the case of the death of a man, from revengeful kinsmen.26 3 This
issue often arose in the United States in property confiscation cases
decided after the Civil War."4
Time is a third limitation on the power. Because the power to
pardon is given only for "offenses against the United States," the
crime must precede the pardon; it may not be anticipated. Other-
wise the power that allows presidential clemency for the conse-
quence of a violation would be a power to dispense with the observ-
ance of the law. But, as the Court said in Ex parte Garland,265 the
pardoning power "may be exercised at any time after [the commis-
sion of the offense], either before legal proceedings are taken, or
during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.""2
Whether contempt of court is a pardonable crime is an important
issue in determining the scope of the power. In Ex Parte Grossman"7
the Court considered only criminal contempt.2 Grossman violated
261. Therefore, the only possibility that former President Nixon's full involvement in
Watergate will be uncovered is through state criminal proceedings and civil suits.
262. Thomas v. Sorrell, 89 Eng. Rep. 63, 100 (K.B. 1673). See text accompanying notes
55-59 supra.
263. See note 59 supra & accompanying text.
264. Compare Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877) with Osborn v. United States,
91 U.S. 474 (1875). In Knote the Court held that a pardon could not restore proceeds paid to
whom the law assigned them. 95 U.S. at 155. In Osborn the Court held that if the proceeds
are not lawfully distributed to a party entitled to receive them or paid into the Treasury, no
vested right accrued to prevent a pardon from restoring them to the claimant. 91 U.S. at 477.
265. 71 U.S. (9 Wall.) 333 (1866).
266. Id. at 380. See also United States v. Burdick, 211 F.492 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), in which
Judge Learned Hand remarked: "I have no doubt whatever that the President may pardon
those who never have been convicted. The English precedents are especially pertinent." Id.
at 493.
267. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
268. One commentator, considering the distinction between civil and criminal contempt
in detail, has noted that for civil contempt the punishment is "remedial" whereas for criminal
contempt the punishment is "punitive." That is, the former is directed at aiding a third
party, the complainant, and the latter, to vindicate the authority of the court. Beale,
Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARv. L. REV. 161 (1907). See also McCrone v.
United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939).
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an injunction entered on behalf of the United States and was ar-
rested, found guilty of contempt of court, and sentenced to one year
in jail and a fine of $1000. Thereafter, he was granted a pardon by
President Coolidge. Grossman accepted the pardon, paid the fine,
and was released. Six months later the District Court recommitted
him to the House of Correction to serve his sentence notwithstand-
ing the pardon.
On behalf of the lower court, special assistants to the Attorney
General argued that the power to punish for contempt is inherent
in, and essential to, the very existence of the judiciary. Were the
President allowed to substitute his discretion for that of the court
he would become the ultimate source of judicial authority. Such a
holding, argued the prosecutors, would be a distortion of the cardi-
nal principle of American government that the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches are independent and co-equal.6 9 The
special assistants also suggested that contempt of court is not an
offense "against the United States" and thus is not within the pur-
view of the power of the President to pardon.
270
The Court rejected this argument and adopted the plaintiff's con-
tention that the power to pardon for contempt is inherent in the
pardoning power.27' The Court ordered Grossman released and held
that the President's power extended to pardons of criminal con-
tempt of court:
The king of England before our Revolution, in the exercise of his
prerogative, had always exercised the power to pardon contempts
of court just as he did ordinary crimes and misdemeanors ....
In the mind of a common-law lawyer of the eighteenth century
the word "pardon" included within its scope the ending by the
king's grace of the punishment of such derelictions, whether it is
269. 267 U.S. at 98.
270. Id. at 93-95.
271. Attorney General Stone, as amicus curiae, argued that the history of the power to
pardon for criminal contempts establishes that the grant of the pardoning power to the
President by the Constitution "was intended to embrace criminal contempts in the phrase
'offenses against the United States'." Id. at 102. See also 3 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 622 (1841) ("A
pardon has been held to extend to a contempt committed in Westminister Hall, under
circumstances not materially different .... "); 4 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 317 (1844) (the power vested
in the President to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States is
sufficient to authorize him to remit a fine imposed upon a citizen for contempt in neglecting
to serve as a juror); 19 Op. Arr'y GEN. 476 (1890) (the President has power to grant a pardon
to a prisoner undergoing punishment for contempt of court).
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imposed by the court without a jury or upon indictment, for both
forms of trial for contempts were had.272
Moreover, the Court noted that criminal contempts of a federal
court had been pardoned for eighty-five years.27
The Supreme Court thus ratified a power of the executive that
had been and can be used to frustrate powers essential to the opera-
tion of the judiciary, power a lower court described earlier as "as
inherent and indispensible as a judge."2"' The contempt power is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs; consequently, it is
essential to the due administration of justice. "A Court without the
power effectually to protect himself against the assaults of the law-
less, or to enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees against the recu-
sant parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation and a
stigma upon the age which invented it."'75 Yet the President has the
unchecked power to frustrate this essential authority of the court.
The argument is not that courts erred in their reading of jurispru-
dential history, but that the framers overlooked the need to hold the
power to pardon in check. The holding of Grossman arms the Presi-
dent with a power that enables him to shield his subordinates
against judicial interference.
America always has been vigilant in preserving her liberties.
Speaking of the system of "mixed governments" in England, Bol-
ingbroke observed: "It is by this mixture of. . [power], blended
together in one System, and by these three Estates balancing one
272. 267 U.S. at 110. William Howard Taft, who served as President and later as Chief
Justice, suggested in a lecture:
Where a court is seeking to enforce a decree or a judgment against a contuma-
cious party and puts him in prison for the purpose of compelling him to comply
with the judgment or decree, then I do not think the President could pardon a
man or relieve him from the effect of such an order because he would really be
obstructing the cause of justice. But where the court is merely vindicating its
own authority by punishing a man for a past contempt, and where an imprison-
ment is not a continuing duress for the purpose of compelling obedience, it
seems to me that the punishment inflicted is for an offence against the United
States, to wit, a defiance of judicial authority, and therefore that it does come
within the range of the power of pardon by the President.
W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 120-21 (1916).
273. 267 U.S. at 118. But see The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885), decided forty years before
Grossman. There the Court noted in dictum that the pardoning power was unlimited "except
in cases of impeachment and where fines are imposed by a co-ordinate department of the
government for contempt of its authority ...." Id. at 413.
274. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 455 (8th Cir. 1902).
275. Id. at 455.
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another, that... [the] free Constitution of Government hath been
preserved so long inviolate. . .I" The founding fathers were
steeped in this type of literature. They were surrounded not only by
the writing of Bolingbroke but also by the works of such eminent
writers as Cicero and Montesquieu. The early American constitu-
tionalists were well aware that liberty was to be preserved only by
maintaining institutional restraints and a just division of powers.
The simplest government would not ensure the maximum freedom.
But a government of law, guaranteeing optimum liberty, required
numerous limitations and qualifications on the powers of govern-
ment. The founders of the American government were no doubt the
greatest innovators of the theory of "mixed governments," but in
their desire to protect society from inflexible laws "' and, ironically
enough, to establish a means of facilitating complete
investigations, 7 they allowed one enumerated power to proceed
unfettered.27'
The query naturally suggested by Grossman is whether a con-
tempt of Congress constitutes a pardonable offense. Story suggests
that it is necessary that the branches be independent and have the
ability to discharge their duties: "If the executive should possess the
power of pardoning any . . . offender [who interrupts the affairs of
Congress] ..... [the legislature] would be wholly dependent upon
[the executive's] good will and pleasure for the exercise of their
own powers."s2  But the argument based on the ground of separation
of powers no longer seems feasible in light of Grossman."' The power
of the "Grand Inquest of the Nation" to compel testimony via a
contempt citation is easily frustrated if the executive branch so
pleases.212
276. N. BOLINGBROKE, A DISERTATION UPON PARTIES 158 (5th ed. London 1739).
277. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 110-12 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES].
278. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 426 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter
cited as RECORDS].
279. The courts have not yet considered whether the President may pardon civil contempts
of court. Perhaps, however, to pardon for civil contempts would be an interference with the
rights of third parties. In Grossman, the Court stated: "For civil contempts, the punishment
is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant, and a pardon cannot stop it." 267 U.S. at
111 (dictum). See also text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
280. J. STORY, supra note 259, at 551-52.
281. See 267 U.S. at 119-20.
282. Even though the courts have not spoken to this issue, the executive has issued pardons
for Congressional contempts, e.g., the 1938 pardon by Franklin D. Roosevelt of Dr. Francis
Townsend, leader of an old age pension group, who was found guilty of contempt for refusal
to testify.
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The power may be used in other ways to suppress a constitutional
action by Congress. The most obvious exercise of the power to
impede Congressional authority is the pardoning of all individuals
convicted under a statute the President opposes. In a preliminary
draft of his first address to Congress, Jefferson included a declara-
tion that the Sedition Act was "a palpable and qualified contradic-
tion to the Constitution" and announced that he intended, pursuant
to the powers vested in him by Article II, section 2, to pardon those
convicted under the Act."83 Inasmuch as the President is free to
exercise the pardoning power for good reason, bad reason, or no
reason at all, the clause was considered superfluous and was elimi-
nated from Jefferson's final draft.8 In sum, even if a presidential
veto is overridden by two-thirds of Congress, the executive still pos-
sesses the dominating power.285
The Nixon Pardon
I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States, pursuant to the
pardon power conferred upon me by Article II, Section 2, of the
Constitution, have granted and by these presents do grant a full,
free and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses
against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has commit-
ted or may have committed or taken part in during the period
from January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974.86
With these words, the power of the presidency was displayed awe-
somely. In an analysis of the President's power to pardon, it is
difficult to overlook the most recent controversial exercise of the
power in American history, although the exercise of the prerogative
of mercy by Gerald Ford is much more significant in a political
history of the United States than in a constitutional history. 7
Nixon had been forced from office by the threat of being the first
283. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWER 350 n.59 (4th ed. 1957).
284. Id.
285. For a further discussion of the potential conflict between the branches caused by the
pardoning power, see Morris, Some Phases of the Pardoning Power, 12 A.B.A.J. 183, 184-86
(1926).
286. Pres. Proc. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32601-02 (1974).
287. To many the pardon of Richard Nixon seemed to be a great perversion of the power
that violated the intention of the framers. During the formation conventions Iredell remarked
that "pardon in a Republican government was not to protect felons with powerful friends,
but to protect society from ineffective laws." 4 DEBATES, supra note 277, at 110-12. Wilson
believed that the pardoning power should facilitate rather than circumvent a thorough inves-
tigation. 2 RECORDS, supra note 277, at 426.
[Vol. 18:475
PRESIDENT'S PARDONING POWER
President removed from the presidency by the Congress."'5 His resig-
nation was followed thirty days later by a pardon from his chosen
successor. To many the pardon smacked of a deal between Gerald
Ford and Richard Nixon."5 9 To dispel this apprehension, Ford volun-
teered to appear before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Justice."'
Before the Committee Ford emphasized that there was no deal
between the former President and himself. 9' The pardon was
granted, according to the President, to "change our national focus
. . .to shift our attention from the pursuit of a fallen President to
the pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation." 9 ' Some members
of the Committee, notably Elizabeth Holtzman, were unsatisfied
with Ford's answers. One question asked by Representative Holtz-
man and unanswered by Ford sought an explanation for the Presi-
dent's failure to specify any of the crimes for which Nixon was
pardoned.
Holtzman's query is not only an important political issue, but it
raises an interesting legal problem: Is a pardon that does not specify
an offense valid? The answer must begin with an explicit statement
of the time-honored canon of constitutional interpretation that
words used in a constitution or charter carry with them the meaning
of their origin. 213 To the mind of the eighteenth century statesman,
the word "pardon" conveyed the power exercised by the Crown in
England.29 ' Of the thirty-one lawyer-delegates attending the Con-
vention of 1787, five had received their legal education at the Mid-
288. See Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H. R. REP.
No. 1305, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974).
289. Stone, Pardons and Testimony, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1974, at 43, col. 2.
290. The appearance was in response to resolutions introduced by Representatives Abzug
and Conyers. H.R. Res. 1367, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. Res. 1370, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). More than seventy members of Congress had sponsored similar bills and resolutions.
291. If pardons are granted because removal is punishment enough, as Ford answered when
queried before the subcommittee, see Testimony Before House Judiciary Subcommittee,
reprinted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at 18-20, Art. I, sec. 3, cl. 7 of the Constitution, which
states that the impeached and removed official "shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment according to Law", is in effect defunct. See
Firmage & Mangrum, Removal of the President: Resignation and the Procedural Law of
Impeachment, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1023; Macgill, The Nixon Pardon: Limits on the Benign
Prerogative, 7 CONN. L. REv: 56 (1974).
292. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at 18, col. 4.
293. "Words of art bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of their habitat
. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
537 (1947).
294. See notes 170-71 supra & accompanying text.
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dle Temple, four at the Inner Temple.295 There can be little doubt
that the others were at least familiar with the great works of the
leading English writers. The courts have given great weight to that
fact.
The Supreme Court never has been called upon to judge the valid-
ity of an open pardon like the Nixon pardon. If it must do so in the
future and if it continues to view Article II, section 2 in light of the
meaning the framers intended it to have, the evidence raises a rea-
sonable doubt of the constitutionality of the Nixon pardon.
Under examination by the Subcommittee, Ford admitted that he
had no knowledge of anything that "rises to the level ... to prove
even a probable criminal violation." ' " He had only the September
4th memorandum from Deputy Special Prosecutor Ruth to Special
Prosecutor Jaworski listing ten "possibilities""2 7 and had no knowl-
edge "of any other potential or possible criminal charges."2"
To guard against fraud on the part of persons seeking to secure a
pardon, it was a general rule in England "that wherever it
appeare[d] by the recital of the pardon, that the king was misin-
formed, or not rightly apprised both of the heinousness of the crime,
and also, how far the party stands convicted upon the record, the
pardon [was] void ..." 29 The reasoning behind the rule was that
the king was entrusted with the high prerogative upon a special
confidence that he would spare only those whose cases "the Law
itself may be presumed willing to have excepted out of its general
Rules, which the Wit of Man cannot possibly make so perfect as to
suit every particular Case . . ."00 Hawkins added further:
It hath been holden, That anciently a Pardon of all Felonies,
included all Treasons, as well as Felonies whatsoever, and might
be pleaded to an Indictment for them: And it seems to be taken
for granted, in many Books, that a Pardon of all Felonies in
general, without describing any one particular Felony, may even
at this Day, if the Party be neither attainted or indicted, be
pleaded in Bar of any Felony whatsoever, coming within the gen-
eral Limitations of the Pardon, except Murder or Rape, and that
295. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 87 n.160 (1973).
296. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at 19, col. 2.
297. Id.
298. Id. at col. 5.
299. 5 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW *290.
300. W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. -, § 8, at 382-83 (London
1716).
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the only Reason why it cannot be also pleaded to Murder or Rape,
is because the Statute of 13 R. 2 . . ., requires an express Mention
of them. But I find this Point no where solemnly debated; neither
doth it seem easy to reconcile it with the general Rules concerning
Pardons, agreed to be good in other Cases; for if a Felony cannot
be well pardoned where it may be reasonably intended that the
King, when he granted the Pardon was not fully apprised of the
State of the Case, much less doth it seem reasonable that it
should be pardoned where it may be well intended that he was
not apprised of it at all. 0'
Of course, it could be argued that because Ford had the available
information on the ten "possibilities" at the time of the pardon, it
is valid insofar as it applies to those ten areas. 02 At the time, how-
ever, these ten "possibilities" were even beyond proof by the Special
Prosecutor's Office, although to President Ford, Nixon's acceptance
was tantamount to an admission of guilt. 03 But only courts can pass
judgment on the guilt or innocence of an individual; as long as the
courts have not agreed on the meaning of acceptance, it is dangerous
to maintain that acceptance implies guilt in every case.34
The implication of acceptance is the second interesting constitu-
tional issue raised by the pardon of President Nixon. As noted ear-
lier, in Ex parte Garland05 the Supreme Court noted that a pardon
"blots out of existence the guilt" and makes the offender "as inno-
cent as if he had never committed the offense.""3 A half century
after that decision, the Court said that acceptance of a pardon was
an acknowledgement of one's guilt.3 ' Viewed together, the two
statements are indeed paradoxical. By ascension from the hell of
guilt to the heaven of innocence, one is compelled to admit his guilt
to become an innocent man.
301. Id. at § 9, at 383-84 (footnotes omitted).
302. Macgill, supra note 291, at 84-85.
303. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at 20, col. 5.
304. The courts have shifted back and forth from the "new man" theory to the "implication
of guilt" theory to suit the needs of an individual case. Compare, e.g. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.
v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92 (1890); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872); Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. 333 (1866); Ex parte Hunt, 10 Ark. 284 (1850) with in re Spencer, 22 F. Cas. 921
(C.C.D. Ore. 1878) No. 13,234); Manlove v. State, 153 Ind. 80 (1899); Roberts v. State, 160
N.Y. 217 (1899); Cook v. Freeholders, 26 N.J.L. 326 (1857).
305. 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
306. Id. at 380.
307. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). See also Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S.
51 (1914) and the opinion in Roberts v. State, 160 N.Y. 217 (1899): "A pardon proceeds not
upon the theory of innocence, but implies guilt. If there was no guilt, theoretically at least,
there would be no basis for pardon." Id. at 221.
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The root of the confusion may be traced to the origin of the power.
The effect of a pardon in the mid-thirteenth century was, as Bracton
stated:
[A] person is not restored to the King's peace alone, that he
may go and return and contract anew, for that which has been
dissolved by the outlawry cannot be joined anew by the inlawry
without a new intention on the part of those who have contracted
... he is like a new born infant and a new man, as it were, lately
born 308
In other words, those placed outside the law were given back their
legal capacity; they were "new born" in the eyes of the law, not
innocent.
The fires of confusion may also have been fed by the opinion of
Chief Justice Hobart in Cuddington v. Wilkins.3 19 Cuddington sued
Wilkins for slander after Wilkins called him a thief. Because Cud-
dington had been pardoned of theft, the Court held for him, stating:.
Now when the King had discharged it and pardoned him of it,
he hath cleared the person of the crime and infamy, wherein no
private person is interested but the commonwealth, whereof he
is the head, and in whom all general wrongs reside, and to whom
the reformation of all general wrongs belongs.
31
1
Further, Hawkins has stated that a pardon makes an individual
"a new Man, and gives him new Capacity and Credit. ' 31' 1 The
phrase has become familiar to readers of American constitutional
law. These early legal commentators did not mean to imply that a
pardon operates as a dismissal of the fact. Chief Justice Hobart's
reasoning is analogous to the case of an individual cured from a form
of leprosy; although it would be nothing short of a lie to call that
person a leper, it would be perfectly valid to call him a former leper.
This reasoning is congruent with the effect of a pardon on the com-
petency of a witness who is a pardoned felon. Such a witness has
the capacity to testify although the jury must weigh his credibil-
ity.312 This reasoning also comports with the decision of the Supreme
308. 3 H. DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS 9r CONSUETUDINEBUS ANGLIANE 371 (S. Thorne trans.
1879).
309. 80 Eng. Rep. 231 (1615).
310. Id. See also Searle v. Williams, 80 Eng. Rep. 433 (1618).
311. W. HAWKINS, supra note 300, at 395.
312. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892).
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Court in Carlesi v. New York,31 3 in which the Court held it proper
for the trial court to consider a pardoned crime when prescribing
penalties for a later offense.
The confusion continues to plague American law because the pol-
icy of granting pardons for a variety of reasons lingers. They are
granted for both innocence and guilt."4
CONCLUSION
One element in the nature of the pardoning power is predominant
when that power is analyzed through American constitutional
theory. Alone among the powers enumerated in the Constitution,
the power to pardon proceeds unfettered. Thus, of all the powers of
the United States' tripartite system of government, this power has
the greatest potential for abuse, for from "power unrestricted, comes
impunity to delinquency in all shapes .... ."I" Neither the Congress
nor the courts can question the motives of the President in the use
of the power. Although nothing higher than the laws should exist in
a democracy, one constitutionally-sanctioned exception to this
noble theorem permeates the American system. "To the executive
alone is entrusted the power, and it is entrusted without limit."'316
The only "rule" governing the use of the power is that the President
shall not exercise it against the public interest, 17 though he alone
is given the discretion to define the public interest.
Naturally it is more difficult to be constructive than it is to be
critical. There are four alternative methods of dealing with the par-
doning power. First, one might leave the power as it is, unchecked,
and hope that the American electorate continues to select, with just
as few exceptions as in the past, highly ethical leaders. The people
are, as Madison observed, the primary check, but he hastened to
add that alternative checks are no doubt necessary.3 Usurpations
of power often build too slowly for any to see but the jealous eye of
a co-equal partner.
313. 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
314. Henry Weihofen suggests that a distinction be made between pardons granted for
innocence and those granted for other reasons. "A pardon for innocence is an acquittal, and
must be given all the effects of an acquittal. A pardon for other reasons . . . leaves the
determination of the convict's guilt stand, and only relieves him from the legal consequences
of that guilt." Weihofen, The Effects of a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 177, 179 (1939).
315. 1 J. BENTHAM, WORKS 530 (Edinburgh 1843).
316. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871).
317. W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENCY 95 (1916).
318. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 322 (1961) (J. Madison).
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Second, the power might be eliminated totally. In the United
States, an individual is assured due process of law. He is allowed to
confront his accuser and is permitted benefit of counsel. Indigents
are given court-appointed attorneys. There are strict rules of evi-
dence and procedure which, if disregarded, permit a motion for a
mistrial. The accused is given the presumption of innocence in a
trial before twelve of his peers, "good and true." There is one right
of appeal and the possibility for further appeals. Arguably, pardons
only produce an atmosphere of disrespect for the laws. In addition,
it has been suggested that in a perfect system of laws, there is no
need for a pardon: "To praise the clemency of the sovereign ... is
to praise the surgeon who allows his patient to perish by not cutting
off a gangrened finger.
319
There is, however, a natural repugnance of the irretrievable and
irrevocable that springs from man's recognition of his own fallibil-
ity. As Justice Story observed, "no man in his senses will contend,
that any system of law can provide for every possible shade of guilt
a proportionate degree of punishment. ' 30 Different circumstances
in similar "crimes" often require necessary distinctions in degrees
of punishment and guilt. To eliminate this means of mitigation
would be unjust.
Third, the power of clemency might be concentrated in another
branch of government. Beccaria argued that "clemency is the virtue
of the maker, not executor of the laws ... "321 It would be difficult,
however, for a group as large and diverse as a legislative body to
dispense mercy as effectively as a single executive. For such a group
to debate each individual pardon would bring to a halt the urgent
matters that require the forum of the legislative chambers. Alterna-
tively, the power might be given to the judiciary; after all, justice
is meant to be dispensed by the judicial tribunals. But the judiciary
has a poor vantage point for observing the "political thicket." The
principal reason, however, for not vesting the power in the other
branches is that the power provides a needed check on the powers
of the judiciary and legislature. It would serve the system of "checks
and balances" little good if an unchecked power were eliminated
while the existing forces operating against the branches other than
the executive were diminished. The power can be used to correct the
319. 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 315, at 520.
320. J. STORY, supra note 259, at 548.
321. M. DE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 131-32 (1768).
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decisions made by a judicial department lacking total flexibility. It
can be employed also to correct the inherent limitations of the legis-
lative branch: the intrinsic inability of a legislative body to identify
every combination of cases.
Iredell's query, "where could [the pardoning power] be more
properly vested, than in a man who had received such strong proofs
of his possessing the highest confidence of the people," '322 together
with an analysis of the other choices, forces the solution. It is possi-
ble to leave the power in the executive office and yet bring it into
balance with the otherwise poetic system of "separation of powers"
and "checks and balances" proven so beneficial. The optimum solu-
tion lies in the adoption of the amendment proposed by Senator
Mondale in the 93rd Congress. "No pardon granted an individual
by the President under section 2 of Article II shall be effective if
Congress by resolution, two-thirds of the members of each House
concurring therein, disapproves the granting of the pardon within
180 days of its issuance."'
The proposal would provide a sufficient check on the prerogative
of the executive which need be invoked only in controversial cases.
"The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its
branches . . . [and] letting slip the golden opportunity '3 24 would
be avoided. The effect of the pardon need not await the sanction of
Congress, for the Congress is given the burden of going forward with
the process. The proposed check is analogous to the courts' powers
of judicial review, by which legislation is given complete effect until
adjudicated unconstitutional.2 5
Many may contend that the case for change has not been made
here or that the need cannot be proven in the United States because
the power has never been abused to such an extent as to require
adoption of an alternative method. Obviously, the word "abuse" has
an individual meaning, and to some, the political uses of the power
during the Reconstruction period and the aftermath of Watergate
may not connote abusive exercises. But when one proposes adjust-
322. 4 DEBATES, supra note 277, at 111.
323. S.J. Res. 240, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974).
324. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 449 (1961) (A. Hamilton).
325. The adoption of this proposal would eliminate the need for an amendment restricting
use of the power to individuals already convicted. If the timing of the pardon seemed incon-
gruent with the goals of the United States, Congress could, under the Mondale proposal,
initiate nullifying procedures. A resolution suggesting that the power be limited to postcon-
viction stages was introduced by Senator Proxmire. S.J. Res. 239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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ments to the system to bring it into conformance with the basic
doctrine of American constitutionalism, the presumption rests with
the apologists for constitutional balance. The constitutional framers
of 1787 did not find it necessary to wait for unfortunate incidents
to employ the safeguards of liberty. The Nixon pardon comes close
enough to abuse to force speculations and inspire just apprehen-
sions.
